APPENDIX

Table A1. Definition of variables (Boolean/dichotomized version)

Variable/Condition	Indicator (Threshold)	Sources
	Outcome	
PSI	Composite index of Party System Institutionalization or iPSI (0)	Casal Bértoa & Enyedi (2014)
	Category A: Socio-economic	
WEALTH	Mean annual GDP *per capita* for the period studied, but lagged (12000)	World Bank (2010)
ERCON	Average of the CIFP global rank based index scores for ethnic and religious diversity (49)	Skaaning (2007)
CCUM	Line of linear fit (R²) between the two most salient cleavages in a particular country (0.5)	Casal Bértoa (2014)[1]
PCUL	"Survival/self-expression values" (SSEV) scores (-0.7)	Inglehart and Welzel (2005)[2]
	Category B: Historic-structural	
LEGAC	Early development scores (29)	Kitschelt (2001:7: 46-47)
PDEM	Yes (1)/No (0)	Rivera (1996:182)
YoD	Years since the (re-)inauguration of democracy (15)	Müller-Rommel *et al*. (2004:871)
EUCON	Number of years since accession to the EU (4)	www.europa.eu
	Category C: Systemic Institutional	
PI[3]	Average age of the (currently existing) political parties receiving at least 10% of the vote in any legislative election (16)	Dix (1992)
EDISP	Least-square index or LSq. (7)	Gallagher´s (1991)
PCON	"Effective" number of parliamentary parties or ENPP (4.1)	Mainwaring and Scully (1995)
POLAR	Distance between the leftmost and rightmost party in a system (10)	Abedi (2002:556)[4]
PARL	Parliamentarism (1)/Semi-presidentialism[5] (0)	Elgie & Moestrup (2008)
PFUND	Party funding…in 2/3 of the elections (1)/…in less (0)	Birnir (2005)

Notes on dichotomization:

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[1] In order to calculate cleavage cumulation I use the data provided by Benoit and Laver (2006) on the position of parties according to different (political) cleavages.

[2] In particular, I use for each country the score given by the wave of the *World Value Survey* closest to the moment of the inauguration of democracy.

[3] Following Casal Bértoa (2012: 456; 2014a), PI is defined here as "the process by which parties form consistent patterns of mass mobilization and internal organization".

[4] In order to calculate ideological polarization I use the data provided by Benoit and Laver (2006) on the position of parties within the left-right spectrum.

[5] Following Elgie (1999: 13), by now a standard definition of the notion (e.g. Elgie, 2011; Kirschke, 2007; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2010; Shugart 2006), I consider semi-presidentialism to be "a regime where there is both a popularly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and a cabinet responsible to the legislature".

a) iPSI is operationalized using z-scores for standardization as its three components originally present different ranges: from 50 to 100 (alternation), and from 0 to 100 (familiarity and access). In this context, using a z-score of 0 to distinguish between institutionalized and weakly institutionalized party systems makes sense not only from a mathematical (natural threshold), but also from an analytical point of view. Thus, not only is the break between Bulgaria and Croatia the largest (7 points), but it is also in consonance with the major rankings of institutionalization found in the literature (see Lewis, 2006; Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011; Casal Bértoa and Mair, 2012).

b) WEALTH looks at GDP *per capita*, setting poor apart from rich Eastern European countries. Using $12000 to distinguish between the two is in accordance not only with the literature, which tends to distinguish between the more economically advanced countries in Central Europe and the less developed ones in South-Eastern Europe and the Baltics, but also a natural gap in the data. Indeed, the break between Estonia and Hungary (roughly 1000 points) is the largest.

c) ERCON refers to the joint number and size of ethnic and religious groups, and it ranges between 0 (high diversity) and 100 (low diversity).

d) CCUM ranges between 0 and 1, with the former meaning perfect cleavage cross-cuttingness and the latter perfect cleavage cumulation.

e) PCUL reports the SSEV scores closest in time to the final year in the analysis (i.e. 2010). Based on the Eastern European literature (e.g. Pollack *et al.*, 2003; Klingeman *et al.*, 2006; and Stojarová *et al.*, 2007), the simple average is used to distinguish between systems with a highly and lowly developed political culture. Post-communist countries are thus clustered into two equally populated groups.

f) LEGAC follows Kitschelt's (2001) distinction between bureaucratic-authoritarian national-accommodative, and patrimonial communism. Following Kitschelt's own works, either alone (1995) or with his colleagues (1999), the first two types (with scores ≥30), more favourable for PSI, are distinguished from patrimonial communist regimes (<30). Not included in Kitschelt's gradation, Serbia was assigned a score according to its historical-geographical affiliation to South-Eastern Europe.

g) YoD distinguishes between systems where democracy has been "the only game in town" (Linz and Stepan, 1996:5) for more than ¾ of the period here analysed (i.e. 1990-2010) and those where democracy has only recently consolidated.

h) EUCON makes a distinction between those countries that were part of the first Eastern European enlargement (in 2004) and those that, at the time of the analysis, were not members of the EU or had recently (in 2007) joined it.

i) Considering that "the older an organisation is, the more likely it is to endure even longer" (Dix 1992, p. 491), building on Casal Bértoa (2013:423-425) and in clear correspondence with Lewis' (2006) ranking, PI considers that political parties are institutionalized in those systems where, on average, parties have survived for more than ¾ of the period here analysed.

j) Based on the previous literature (Lijphart, 1994: Casal Bértoa, 2011:194; Nikolenyi, 2014), EDISP classifies electoral systems into disproportional (LSq.≥7) and proportional (LSq.<7).

k) Using Sartori (1976) as well as Mainwaring and Scully (1995:31-32) as the main point of departure, PCON distinguishes between moderate (ENPP≤4) and pluralist (ENPP>4) party systems (see also Casal Bértoa, 2013: 400-402).

l) The POLAR index used here employs Benoit and Laver's (2006) dataset, which ranges from -10 to 10.

Table A2. Raw Data and Crisp-set Memberships (i.e. Boolean scores) in the Outcome and Conditions

	Hun	**Slv**	**Cze**	**Rom**	**Slk**	**Ukr**	**Cro**	Bul	Ser	Est	Lit	Lat	Pol
	Outcome												
PSI	3.5 (1)	2.5 (1)	1.4 (1)	0.9 (1)	0.7 (1)	0.4 (1)	0.2 (1)	-0.5 (0)	-0.6 (0)	-0.7 (0)	-1.5 (0)	-2.4 (0)	-3.9 (0)
	Category A												
WEALTH	12904 (1)	12947 (1)	16929 (1)	8545 (0)	13062 (1)	6718 (0)	15418 (1)	7660 (0)	9949 (0)	11906 (0)	10819 (0)	11398 (0)	10884 (0)
ERCON	43.8 (0)	43.8 (0)	31.3 (0)	50 (1)	37.5 (0)	43.8 (0)	50 (1)	62.5 (1)	25 (0)	43.8 (0)	75 (1)	12.5 (0)	87.5 (1)
CCUM	0.8 (1)	0.83 (1)	0.89 (1)	0.15 (0)	0.02 (0)	0.57 (1)	0.89 (1)	0.35 (0)	0.29 (0)	0.02 (0)	0.43 (0)	0.67 (1)	0.03 (0)
PCUL	-1.1 (0)	-0.6 (1)	-0.1 (1)	-1.3 (0)	-0.8 (0)	-0.8 (0)	0.3 (1)	-1.3 (0)	-1 (0)	-0.9 (0)	-0.6 (1)	-0.6 (1)	-0.3 (1)
	Category B												
LEGAC	30 (1)	30 (1)	40 (1)	20 (0)	25 (0)	20 (0)	25 (0)	20 (0)	20 (0)	30 (1)	30 (1)	30 (1)	30 (1)
PDEM	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
YoD	21 (1)	20 (1)	21 (1)	15 (0)	21 (1)	6 (0)	11 (0)	21 (1)	9 (0)	20 (1)	20 (1)	20 (1)	20 (1)
EUCON	5 (1)	5 (1)	5 (1)	2 (0)	5 (1)	0 (0)	0 (1)	2 (0)	0 (0)	5 (1)	5 (1)	5 (1)	5 (1)
	Category C												
PI	19.5 (1)	19 (1)	14.7 (0)	17.4 (1)	13.4 (0)	10.3 (0)	20.8 (1)	14.8 (0)	16.5 (1)	15 (0)	9.2 (0)	15.1 (0)	15.2 (0)
EDISP	11 (1)	3.8 (0)	6.7 (0)	5.5 (0)	6.7 (0)	6.1 (0)	7.6 (1)	7.2 (1)	4.2 (0)	5.2 (0)	10.3 (1)	5 (0)	8.3 (1)
PCON	2.8 (1)	5.2 (0)	4 (1)	3.7 (1)	4.6 (0)	3.4 (1)	3.6 (1)	3.1 (1)	4.3 (0)	4.9 (0)	4.4 (0)	5.5 (0)	4.8 (0)
POLAR	8.1 (0)	9.9 (0)	12.9 (1)	7.5 (0)	10.6 (1)	13.3 (1)	13.2 (1)	9.6 (0)	10 (0)	6.7 (0)	9 (0)	14.7 (1)	9.4 (0)
PARL	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
PFUND	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1

Table A3. Distance Matrix

	HUN	SLV	CZE	ROM	SLK	UKR	CRO	Bul	Ser	Est	Lit	Lat
SLV	-----											
CZE	-----	-1111										
ROM	-2222	12222	22222									
SLK	11111	-----	-----	-1111								
UKR	12222	-2222	11111	------	-1111							
CRO	-1111	-1111	11111	-1111	-2222	-1111						
Bul	-----	-----	-----	12222	-----	-1222	-1111					
Ser	-----	11111	-----	13333	-1222	12222	11111	11111				
Est	-1111	-1111	11111	-1111	-2222	-1111	-----	-1111	11111			
Lit	11111	11111	-1111	-1111	-----	-----	-----	-----	-1111	-----		
Lat	-1111	-2222	12333	-----	-1222	-1222	-----	23333	22222	-----	-----	
Pol	-1111	-1222	11111	-1111	-1222	-----	-----	-1111	11111	-----	-----	11111

Notes: Zone 1 (blue) = MDSO+; Zone 2 (purple) = MDSO-; Zone 3 (yellow) = MSDO. Output generated by the MSDO/MDSO software (version July 8th, 2006), developed by G. De Meur and available at www.jchr.be/01/beta.htm

Figures A1-A3. Most Relevant Pairs

Tables A4-A11. Results of the MDSO/MSDO Analysis[6]

MDSO+

	ROM	CZE		SLV	HUN
PSI	1	1		1	1
WEALTH	0	1		1	1
ERCON	1	0		0	0
CCUM	0	1		1	1
PCUL	0	1		1	0
LEGAC	0	1		1	1
PDEM	0	1		0	0
YoD	0	1		1	1
EUCON	0	1		1	1
PI	1	0		1	1
EDISP	*0*	*0*		*0*	1
PCON	**1**	**1**		0	**1**
POLAR	**1**	0		**1**	**1**
PARL	0	1		0	1
PFUND	**1**	**1**		**1**	**1**

	UKR	HUN		SLV
PSI	1	1		1
WEALTH	0	1		1
ERCON	*0*	*0*		*0*
CCUM	**1**	**1**		**1**
PCUL	*0*	*0*		1
LEGAC	0	1		1
PDEM	*0*	*0*		*0*
YoD	0	1		1
EUCON	0	1		1
PI	0	1		1
EDISP	0	1		0
PCON	**1**	**1**		0
POLAR	0	1		1
PARL	0	1		0
PFUND	0	1		1

Notes: 1 = presence of condition/outcome; 0 = absence of condition.
Scores in bold = similar conditions.

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[6] Scores in bold note the *confirmation* of the hypothesis. Scores in italics mark the *negation* of the hypothesis.

	SLK	CRO
PSI	1	1
WEALTH	**1**	**1**
ERCON	0	1
CCUM	0	1
PCUL	0	1
LEGAC	*0*	*0*
PDEM	1	0
YoD	1	0
EUCON	1	0
PI	0	1
EDISP	0	1
PCON	0	1
POLAR	**1**	**1**
PARL	0	0
PFUND	**1**	**1**

Note: 1 = presence of condition/outcome; 0 = absence of condition.
Scores in bold = similar conditions.

MDSO-

	LAT	BUL		SER
PSI	0	0		0
WEALTH	**0**	**0**		**0**
ERCON	0	1		0
CCUM	1	0		0
PCUL	1	0		0
LEGAC	1	0		0
PDEM	1	0		0
YoD	*1*	*1*		0
EUCON	1	0		0
PI	**0**	**0**		1
EDISP	0	1		0
PCON	0	1		0
POLAR	0	1		1
PARL	1	0		0
PFUND	**0**	**0**		1

Note: 1 = presence of condition; 0 = absence of condition/outcome.
Scores in bold = similar conditions.

MSDO

	SER	ROM		UKR		CRO	SLV
PSI	0	1		1		1	1
WEALTH	0	0		0		1	1
ERCON	**0**	**1**		0		1	0
CCUM	**0**	0		**1**		**1**	**1**
PCUL	0	0		0		1	1
LEGAC	0	0		0		0	1
PDEM	0	0		0		0	0
YoD	0	0		0		0	1
EUCON	0	0		0		0	1
PI	1	1		0		1	1
EDISP	0	0		0		1	0
PCON	**0**	**1**		**1**		**1**	0
POLAR	1	1		0		1	1
PARL	0	0		0		0	0
PFUND	1	1		0		1	1

	ROM	BUL
PSI	1	0
WEALTH	0	0
ERCON	1	1
CCUM	0	0
PCUL	0	0
LEGAC	0	0
PDEM	0	0
YoD	*0*	*1*
EUCON	0	0
PI	**1**	**0**
EDISP	*0*	*1*
PCON	1	1
POLAR	1	1
PARL	0	0
PFUND	**1**	**0**

Note: 1 = presence of condition/outcome; 0 = absence of condition/outcome.
Scores in bold = different conditions.

	CZE	LAT		EST	POL
PSI	1	0		0	0
WEALTH	**1**	**0**		**0**	**0**
ERCON	0	0		0	1
CCUM	**1**	1		**0**	**0**
PCUL	1	1		0	1
LEGAC	1	1		1	1
PDEM	1	1		1	1
YoD	1	1		1	1
EUCON	1	1		1	1
PI	0	0		0	0
EDISP	0	0		0	1
PCON	**1**	**0**		**0**	**0**
POLAR	0	0		0	0
PARL	1	1		1	0
PFUND	**1**	**0**		**0**	1

	LIT	SLV	HUN
PSI	0	1	1
WEALTH	**0**	**1**	**1**
ERCON	*1*	*0*	*0*
CCUM	**0**	**1**	**1**
PCUL	1	1	0
LEGAC	1	1	1
PDEM	0	0	0
YoD	1	1	1
EUCON	1	1	1
PI	**0**	**1**	**1**
EDISP	1	0	1
PCON	0	0	1
POLAR	**0**	**1**	**1**
PARL	0	0	1
PFUND	**0**	**1**	**1**

Note: 1 = presence of condition/outcome; 0 = absence of condition/outcome.
Scores in bold = different conditions.

Table A12. Indicators for the "process-tracing" analysis[7]

Country	Indicators	2nd election	3rd election	4th election	5th election	6th election	Average
Hungary	TEV	26.3	31.6	18.2	8.4	33.7	*23.6*
	NNP	4	2	1	0	3	*2*
	P(S)T	0	0.31	0.4	0.4	0.9	*0.4*
Lithuania	TEV	36.8	48.4	49.9	23.8		*39.7*
	NNP	9	4	3	4		*5*
	P(S)T	0.67	0.55	0.92	0.21		*0.59*

Note: TEV = "Total electoral volatility"; NNP = "Number of new (electoral) parties"; P(S)T = "Party (system) turnover"

Table A13. Results of the Necessity Analysis for the Occurrence/Absence of the Outcome

Causal Condition	Presence of the Outcome (PSI)		Absence of the Outcome (psi)	
	Consistency	*Coverage*	*Consistency*	*Consistency*
Pcon	0.71	0.83	0.83	0.71
Wealth	0.71	1	1	0.75
Ccum	0.71	0.83	0.83	0.71
Pfund	0.86	0.75	0.67	0.8

Source: Table compiled on the basis of the results obtained with fsQCA 2.5

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[7] **TEV is calculated according to the following formula: $TEV = \Sigma|C_{i,t-1} - C_{i,t}|/2$, where $C_{i,t}$ is the vote share for a party i at a given election (t) and $C_{i,t-1}$ is the vote share of the same party I at the previous elections (t-1) (Pedersen, 1979). NNP simply counts the total number of "genuinely new" (Sikk, 2005) parties (i.e. mergers and/or electoral coalitions of old parties are excluded) within the electorate for every election. P(S)T is calculated according to the following formula: $PST = (I+O)/(NPP_{t-1}+NPP_t)$, where I (inflows) is the number of parties entering parliament at a given election, not elected at the immediate previous election; O (outflows) is the number of parties exiting parliament following a given election; NPP_t is the number of parties at a given election; and NPP_{t-1}, the number of parliamentary parties produced by the previous one (Toole, 2000).**

Table A14. Truth Table of "Party System Institutionalization" and Four Conditions

Row #	Causal Conditions				Outcome	Country
	PCON	*WEALTH*	*CUM*	*PFUND*	*PSI*	
# 1	1	0	0	0	0	Bulgaria
# 2	1	1	1	1	1	Croatia/Czech R./Hungary
# 3	0	0	0	0	0	Estonia/Lithuania
# 4	0	0	1	0	0	Latvia
# 5	0	0	0	1	0	Poland/Serbia
# 6	1	0	0	1	1	Romania
# 7	0	1	0	1	1	Slovakia
# 8	0	1	1	1	1	Slovenia
# 9	1	0	1	0	1	Ukraine
# 10... # 16					R	

Note: R = "Logical remainder"

Party acronyms

Hungarian parties

Fidesz   Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union

FKgP   Independent Smallholders' Party

KDNP   Christian Democratic People's Party

MDF   Hungarian Democratic Forum

MIÉP   Hungarian Justice and Life Party

MSZP   Hungarian Socialist Party

SZDSZ   Alliance of Free Democrats

Lithuanian parties

DP	Labour Party
LCS	Liberal Centre Union
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LiCS	Liberal and Centre Union
LKD	Lithuanian Christian Democrats
LKDS	Lithuanian Christian Democratic Union
LLS	Lithuanian Liberal Union
LPKTS	Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees
LRLS	Liberals' Movement of the Republic of Lithuania
LSdP	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party
LTS	Lithuanian Nationalist Union
NS/SL	New Union/Social Liberals
TPP	National Resurrection Party
TS	Homeland Union
VNDPS	Peasants and New Democratic Party Union

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