DOES THE TYPE OF REGIME MATTER?

ON THE PERILS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS FOR PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN EUROPE

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Introduction

Among political scientists the debate about the relative virtues/vices of the different regime types has constituted one of the most incandescent fields of inquiry. Intellectually, such debate was launched almost two decades ago by the conviction that institutions matter as they are considered to have an autonomous impact on the development of party politics. In this context, Linz´s seminal articles on *The Perils of Presidentialism* and *The Virtues of Parliamentarism*, published in 1990, constituted the milestone sparking much of the subsequent discussion. Since then many scholars across the world (Elgie, 2011) have put their efforts into investigating the relationship between type of regime (ToR) and democratic collapse. In terms of regime-related outcomes, however, and in comparison to the work on democratic consolidation, there has been far less research on the impact ToR may have on the process of party system institutionalization (PSI).[1] This is certainly surprising, especially if we take into consideration that the latter has been traditionally considered to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the healthy functioning of democracy (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Mainwaring, 1999).

Seeking to begin to fill this gap in the literature, and employing an original dataset comprising 44 European countries between 1848 and 2014, this paper constitute a first attempt to analyse in-depth the impact different ToR may have on the process of PSI. In this context, and making use of a mixed-methods approach, the paper looks both at indirect and direct effects, with a particular focus on the "causal mechanisms" linking both phenomena.

The paper is structured as follows. Section one looks at the conceptualization (and operationalization) of PSI and the different regime types. The second section presents the dataset, classifying European democracies according to ToR and period. In section three some of the most important arguments advanced by scholars in the course of the regime type debate are summarised, making several new propositions concerning

[1] Bartolini (1984) and Meleshevich (2007) constitute the only exception. But while the former does not explicitly refer to PSI, the latter adopts a power-centric approach.

the possible implications ToR may have for PSI. Combining both a "most-similar-systems" (MSSD) and a "most-different-systems-design" (MDSD), section four analyses the relationship between ToR and institutionalization in 73 European historical "regimes". Section five focuses on the causal mechanisms linking these two variables in two "quasi-experimental" countries: namely, Slovakia and Moldova. The paper concludes with a summary of the main findings.

Party System Institutionalization and Types of Regime: Debated Concepts

As it has been explained elsewhere (Casal Bértoa, 2014, forthcoming), there is a great deal of disagreement among scholars about how PSI should be both conceptualized and operationalized. Notwithstanding the latter, and taking into consideration that most definitions of the notion point to the stability and persistence in the rules and nature of inter-party competition as a central dimension, PSI is consider here to be *the process by which the structure of inter-party competition becomes stable over time*. In other words, a system of parties can be said to be institutionalized when parties cooperate, collaborate and colligate in a predictable and routine manner presenting voters with clearly stable political alliances and, therefore, predictable governmental alternatives (Casal Bértoa and Mair, 2012).

Departing from what has just been said, and bearing in mind that partisan interactions are especially visible at the time of government formation, I will rely here on Casal Bertoa and Enyedi's composite index of PSI (iPSI), which captures the degree to which political alternatives at the time of cabinet formation are identifiable, familiar and reasonable closed to newcomers. In other words, and putting it briefly, the frequent governing alternations (1) are wholesale (i.e. total or none), (2) follow previous coalitional patterns, and (3) remain exclusive to certain (relevant) parties, the higher the iPSI and, therefore, the more a party system will be considered to be institutionalized (2010; see also Casal Bértoa and Mair, 2012: 88-89).

Similarly, and although it may be difficult to believe given the substantial body of literature devoted to the topic (Elgie, 1999; Linz, 1994; Sartori, 1997; Siaroff, 2003), some regime types have been particularly prone to conceptual problems. In particular, that of semi-presidentialism as different scholars have often adopted as many definitions of the notion, converting the set of semi-presidential countries in a pure fishing expedition (Sartori, 1997: 122, Elgie, 1998, 1999). In the current work, and notwithstanding what will be said later on, I rely in principle on Elgie´s purely constitutional conceptualization as "a regime where there is both a popularly elected

fixed-term president and a prime minister and a cabinet responsible to the legislature" (1999: 13). By now the most commonly used definition of the notion (e.g. Kirschke, 2007; Schleiter and Morgen-Jones, 2010; Skach 2005; Shugart 2006), it has the advantage, in clear contrast to others´ (Duverger, 1980; Pasquino, 1997; Sartori, 1997), of being (1) *minimal*, as it focuses solely on the mode of election and removal of the two heads of the executive; (2) *precise* because, omitting any reference to the powers of the president, it minimises the opportunity for variation in case selection from one writer to the next; and (3) *parsimonious* because simply relying on what is considered to be the same basic constitutional structure, it allows for a more accurate differentiation between semi-presidentialism and all versions of parliamentarism and presidentialism (Elgie and Moestrup, 2007).[2]

Fortunately, and even if there is no one generally accepted definition of either parliamentarism or presidentialism (Sartori, 1997: 83), the conceptualization of these two notions has been by far less controversial. Thus, presidentialism is generally defined as a regime where (1) a popularly elected head of state, (2) appoints and directs the government, and (3) cannot be discharged by a parliamentary vote while in office (Sartori, 1997: 84). Conversely, in parliamentarian regimes the head of government (1) is not only elected by parliament, but also (2) needs its support or trust in order to remain in office (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997: 14).

Dataset

In this paper, and in order to test the relationship between ToR and PSI, I undertake what Tilly (1984) called a "huge comparison", making use of a new dataset comprising all European countries that have had a meaningful experience with democracy since 1848. In this context, it is important to note that for a country to be considered democratic it needs to fulfil each one of the following conditions: (1) display a score of at least 6 in the Polity IV index, (2) have held universal (male) suffrage elections at least one, and (3) present governments formed on the basis of a parliamentary majority, and not on the will of the head of state.[3]

Secondly, and because - as it follows from the previous section - our conceptual distinction focuses on the mode of election of the head of state, rather than on his/her

[2] This is not to say, however, that it does not pose any problems, as Elgie himself has recognised (2008: 51).

[3] The only two cases complying with these three conditions but excluded from the analysis are: the Kingdom of Greece (1875-1914), the Second Hellenic Republic (1924-1935), and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1920). The first two are not included in the analysis due to the lack of available data, the third because of the constituent (i.e. Constitutional Convention) character of the 1920 elections.

powers, any classification of regime change has to look at the moment in which direct elections of the president are actually - and not only legally - introduced (or abolished). [4] In this context, I differ from Elgie´s (2011: 24-25) classification of semi-presidential regimes in five instances: namely, Austria, Finland, Iceland, Ireland and the Weimar Republic. In all these cases, even if the directly election of the president had been initially foreseen in their respective Constitutions (1929, 1919, 1944, 1937 and 1919, respectively), direct presidential elections only took place some years later due to various reasons: extreme urgency (e.g. Weimar Republic in 1919), lack of funds (e.g. Austria both in 1931 and 1945) or contestation (e.g. Iceland in 1994, 1945 and 1949), unexpected resignations (e.g. Finland in both 1919 and 1946) or political compromise (e.g. Ireland in 1938). In the meantime the president was indirectly (s)elected without any poll.

Such way of proceeding with my case selection is not only more accurate with the theoretical propositions stated below (see next section), but also it has the advantage of avoiding endogeneity. Indeed, as scholars in the field have pointed out, the adoption of a certain regime type may be due to the existing institutional setting, which certainly includes the party system (Elgie, 2011). However, in all the above-cited cases it is clear that a change in regime type was already foreseen even before the formation of any type of party system. As a result, it seems plausible to think that the level of institutionalization of the party system had no effect on the adoption of/change to a totally different ToR.

Thirdly, in order to avoid faulty comparisons and because we believe that it is only by comparing similar periods of time that we can really understand how party systems form and develop (Casal Bértoa and Mair, 2012: 105), the dataset only considers here - when available - the first twenty-four years after the (re-)inauguration of democracy. In case of regime type change, and building on the theoretical framework explained in the following section, the new period begins in the year the first legislative elections (after the change) took place.

The end result is a dataset with 44 countries, divided into 61 party systems, comprising up to 73 different regimes (46 parliamentarian, 25 semi-presidential, and 2 presidential). Some countries like for example France or Poland comprise, respectively, four and two different periods according to the Republic in question. Some countries,

[4] It is also for this reason that both Kosovo and Turkey, where direct presidential elections are soon to take place (in 2016 and August 2014, respectively), are considered to be parliamentary regimes.

like Austria or Germany, refer to two different party systems (1st and 2nd Republic or the Weimar and the Bonn Republics) comprising different regimes types, depending on the date of the first legislative elections after direct presidential elections (1953 and 1925, respectively). Finland and Portugal are unique in this respect. Thus, while in the former the ToR changed twice (from parliamentarism to semi-presidentialim) in two different periods (i.e. inter-war and post-WWII), the latter experienced up to three different regime changes (from parliamentarian to presidential in 1918, to parliamentarian a year later and, finally, to semi-presidential in 1976). Even others (e.g. Ireland and Iceland) are simply divided according to the ToR. All the countries, party systems, regimes and time periods included in the analysis are displayed in the Appendix.

Types of Regime and Party System Institutionalization: A Complex Relationship

Although since Linz´s (1990a/b) seminal work a great deal of research has been devoted to analyse the effects of constitutional regime choice on the consolidation and functioning of democracy (in general), much less has been researched on the relationship between regime type and PSI. Yet, to the extent that some of the arguments against presidentialism and semi-presidentialism[5] can be extrapolated here, they seem to suggest that, rather than the mode of election of the head of state, it is his/her power that affects the process of PSI, clearly undermining it the higher such power will be (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Sartori, 1997; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Skach, 2005).

However, when the level of systemic institutionalization in our 73 historical democratic regimes is plotted against the degree of power European heads of state have had at their disposal,[6] there seems to be no relationship (r = -.114) between these two variables, even if the sign is in the expected direction. The correlation coefficient is even lower (r = -.092) when three clear outliers (France Second Republic, presidential Portugal and semi-presidential Czech Republic) are excluded from the analysis.[7] Indeed, the fact that both highly (France 5th Republic, Georgia, Ukraine) and lowly (Cyprus, Finland post-1950, Russia) institutionalized party systems can be found among countries with very powerful presidents clearly confirms that, contrary to what has been traditionally believed, the powers of the head of state cannot be employed to explain

[5] For example, competing legitimacy, cohabitation, divided minority government, etc. (Linz 1990a/b; Elgie 2008).

[6] I make use here Siaroff's (2003) historical longitudinal dataset. However, and in order to avoid overestimating (by double counting) the mode of election of the head of state, I have decided to subtract one point from his final scores. For those countries not included in Siaroff´s dataset the power of the head of state has been calculated according to the different constitutional texts.

[7] Using only the countries included in Siaroff´s dataset r = -.007.

why European party systems present such different degrees of institutionalization. In my opinion, we need to focus instead on the mode of election *per se*. Thus, and bearing in mind that the latter is hindered by both a high systemic fragmentation and a low party institutionalization (Casal Bértoa, 2012),[8] I will now proceed to explain two different ways (table 1) in which the popular election of the head of state can deter party systems from becoming institutionalized.

[table 1]

Indirect effects: Fragmentation and...

Presidential elections are commonly thought to influence the size of the legislative party system through a coattails effect (Golder, 2006), although it is not very clearly in the literature if such influence will have an increasing (Filippov et al. 1999; Jones, 1995; Linz, 1994), or a reductive character (Cox 1997; Mozaffar et al., 2003; Shugart and Carey, 1992). Although all these claims seem to be contradictory, the answer to this dilemma is to be found – as usual in political science - somehow in the middle, namely, it will depend on the specific institutional arrangements a country has adopted.

In general, scholars agree that when determining the electoral effects of presidential elections on the number of parties all of the mechanical and psychological effects of single-member district elections (Cox, 1997; Sartori, 1997) apply. In principle, and because this type of elections have a winner-take-all character (i.e., district magnitude is 1), presidential elections should be considered to have a reductive effect. However, and according to the literature on the consequences of electoral systems, such reductive effect will be different depending on the electoral rule employed. Thus, if the electoral rule is plurality, the popular election of the head of state will have a reductive effect as, on the one hand, political elites will tend to form broader coalitions of *like-minded* parties, and voters may opt for strategic voting out of fear of wasting their votes (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997: 36). In Moser´s own words:

> The fear of splitting the vote within a specific ideological camp's potential electorate and allowing victory to a candidate from the opposite end of the political spectrum further reinforces impulses for consolidation [meaning concentration] (2001: 98)

[8] As expected, both fragmentation (-.426) and PI (.351) are significantly correlated (at .01 level) with PSI.

On the contrary, if the electoral formula is majoritarian (i.e. two-round), presidential elections will have the opposite effect. The main reasons for that are three, namely: (1) because presidential elections are the unrivalled event in the political calendar of any country, competition for the presidency enhances the public visibility of politicians through increased media exposure and campaign contributions, boosting their options in future parliamentary elections (Filippov et al., 1999; Müller, 1999: 42-43; Gallagher, 1999: 113); (2) "the expectation of a runoff increases the incentive to compete in the first run, either in the hope of placing among the two most favoured or of gaining bargaining power for support in the runoff of one of the two leading contenders" (Linz, 1994: 22; Golder, 2006: 42);[9] (3) last but not least, because presidents – even if not powerful - are usually seen as the leader of the nation by the majority of the population, the weight of the presidency encourages the formation of parties by ruthless politicians in order to simply satisfy their "personal" ambitions (e.g. Paksas in Lithuania, Eanes in Portugal, Snegur in Moldova, etc.). In other words,

> […] the problem with the majority run-off system [i]s that it provide[s] few incentives for parties to co-operate in support of a single presidential candidate. Instead, it encourage[s] small parties to stand candidates at the first ballot so as to increase their electoral visibility (Elgie, 2001: 219)

Likewise, the extent to which presidential elections will have a reductive effect on the number of parties will also depend on the electoral cycle, concretely, on the temporal proximity of presidential and legislative elections. Thus, and due to the "spillover" effect that the presidency has on the behaviour of voters and party elites in legislative elections (Mainwaring, 1993), if both types of elections are held concurrently, presidential elections will have a reductive effect on the effective number of electoral parties. Conversely, if the two elections do not coincide, such reductive effect will be definitively weaker (Jones, 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Shugart and Carey, 1992). As a result, and taking into consideration all what has been said, popular elected presidents will increase multi-partism in those systems where presidential elections does not have a concurrent/plurality character (table 1).

... Party Institutionalization

In general, it has been argued that non-parliamentarian regimes have acted as a major impediment to the development of institutionalized political parties (Colton,

[9] In fact, as Golder (2006: 47) has maintained, the adoption of run-off provisions will only "exacerbate any legislative fragmentation caused by the use of proportional representation in legislative elections".

1995; Fish, 1997; Linz, 1994; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). Scholars have cited several reasons as to why this has been so.

First, contrary to parliamentary presidents who, not being elected by popular vote, have a strong interest in party building, the institute of a popularly elected president encourages greater personalism, making it more difficult for parties to develop coherent programmes and identities (Mainwaring, 1993; Moser, 1998; White et al. 1995). Moreover, because – as we have already seen – presidential candidates need to seek a broader mandate than any given party, the popular election of the president often induces "[c]ampaign personalization [and] reduces the relevance of party platforms and party organization" (Samuels, 2002: 480). At worst the popular election of the head of state "may serve as an incentive to demagoguery and populism" (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997: 32). In this sense, (semi-)presidentialism may even invigorate the danger of bonapartism, characterized by the instrumentalization of political parties with obvious populist traits (Bahro *et al*., 1998:217).

Second, the personalized character of a presidential race provides no safeguard and not buffer against political "outsiders", with little or no political experience, seeking election (Elgie, 2001; Linz, 1994; Stepan and Suleiman, 1995). As Paksas´ victory in the 2002 presidential contests in Lithuania shows, these individuals may create parties at the last minute in order to run for the presidency, therefore, finding it very difficult to develop parties with strong linkages in society. Moreover, when successful, such presidents tend to ignore their own political parties, personalizing the partisan process (Stepan and Skach, 1993: 20). Thus, presidential elections are considered to contribute to "the creation of small and ephemeral parties, most often the personal vehicles of presidential candidates and little more" (Cadoux, 2007:96). This clearly contrasts with presidents in parliamentary systems, usually long-term career politicians and, in many cases, also former party leaders (either in power or in opposition) over many years. For them, political parties are clearly infused with value.

Third, while the incentive structure in parliamentary regimes encourages party discipline and, therefore, institutionalization of party organization, non-parliamentarian regimes have no such incentives for party loyalty (Epstein, 1967; Linz, 1994; Moser, 2001). In this sense, (semi-)presidentialism may contribute to factionalism, that is, to the institutionalization of division within parties rather than between parties (Azebedo and Nijzink, 2007), leading in the most acute case to the break-up of those political organizations.

A final criticism of (semi-)presidential regimes results from the "above party-politics" character of presidents, which in itself often appears to be a desideratum. Contrary to parliamentary regimes where, by definition, the support of a parliamentary party is a must for a successful candidate to become president, presidential elections encourage the image of a president who is above and against political parties (Huskey, 2007; Linz, 1994; Meleshevich, 2007). Certainly, a non-party president which portrays him/herself as a representative of the whole nation[10] will obviously hinder the process of party institutionalization (PI), as individuals will "focus on forming personal attachments with presidential hopefuls, bypassing association with political parties" (Ishiyama, 2008:42; see also Meleshevich, 2007).

In sum, it seems to be a commonly held notion among scholars that non-parliamentarism is the culprit for the lack of cohesive, disciplined, programmatic, socially rooted political parties in a country.

Direct: Structure of competition

As it results from the definitions stated in section 1, a critical difference between parliamentarian and non-parliamentarian regimes is the presence of a "double electoral process" which might introduce, for the reasons explain below a potential for systemic instability certainly absent in the former.

Contrary to parliamentary presidents, which tend to be elected either as the fruit of a compromise between the totality/majority of political parties or by a qualified majority which forcefully requires the support of the major parliamentary parties,[11] presidential candidates face a different and broader "electoral" constituency (i.e. the electorate as a whole). Because they cannot afford to ignore any more or less significant segment of the population, broad coalitions which may include not only extremist political organizations but also any other political parties with a minimum electoral strength are likely to be formed. The main implication of this might be that, as a reward for their support in elections, "one or more of them can plausibly claim to represent the decisive electoral bloc in a close contest and may make demands accordingly" (Linz, 1990a: 58), namely: participation in government, future electoral cooperation, etc. In this context, an element of instability in the structure of inter-party competition is introduced as the majority of leading presidential candidates will be "forced" to seek the

[10] In parliamentary republics, even when elected with the support of a particular party or coalition, heads of state tend to adopt a neutral, rather than negative, attitude towards parties.

[11] Parliamentary parties tend to see this "almost compulsory" collaboration as *ad hoc* and strictly occasional.

cooperation of forces with which they would otherwise not be ready to collaborate, giving way to previously unseen cabinet coalitions or to the inclusion of a party excluded from government up to that time. This is clear in single-round elections, where electoral plurality might depend on even the small number of voters those "unusual partners" might be able to provide, but most especially in two-round elections, where political alliances come closer to the process of coalition formation in a parliament in search of a prime minister.

Moreover, because "the [presidential] 'majority' generated might not represent a politically more or less homogeneous electorate or a real coalition of parties" (Linz, 1994: 21), these alliances of "presidential" parties tend to be very fragile and short-termed, since ideological and policy differences among heterogeneous member-parties of a loose (pre-)electoral presidential coalition are likely to broaden with time. Therefore, while in parliamentary regimes parties occupying different electoral niches normally compete against one another and the coalition of ideologically "close" parties generally takes place after the election and are binding; in (semi-)presidential regimes, the majoritarian character of the presidential elections not only may change the existing structure of inter-party competition, but tends also to impregnate the new patterns of interaction with a loose and temporary character.

This is not to say, however, that non-parliamentarism and party system under-institutionalization are inexorably link. What I do contend here, though, is that contrary to parliamentary system where such double electoral process does not exist, the popular elections of the president in both presidential and semi-presidential regimes introduces a "window of opportunity" for altering the pre-existing patterns of inter-party competition that political parties/elites may take or may not. It is a question of potentiality whose effects will also depend on both the sequence and timing in which presidential elections take place. Thus, and as it follows from table 1, presidential elections are expected to have a direct de-stabilizing effect on the structure of competition in just two cases: (1) when they are held simultaneously (or relatively close in time) to legislative elections,[12] and (2) when the former precede the latter.[13] If presidential elections follow legislative elections, no impact is expected, especially the longer the time spam between the two.

Type of Regime, Fragmentation and Party (System) Institutionalization

[12] Romania (until 2008) and Portugal in 1918, the only two European countries with concurrent elections, constitutes the most evident example.
[13] The logic is very similar to the "presidential coattails" effect explained above.

A first, and very simplistic, empirical evidence that different types of regime had had a very diverse impact, either directly or indirectly, on the process of institutionalization of European party systems over time is presented in the table below. Table 2, which together with the iPSI – explained above – makes use of the "effective" number of electoral parties (ENEP) and the average party age (AGE) to respectively measure systemic fragmentation and PI,[14] clusters all European party systems since 1848 according to different waves of democratization,[15] making a clear distinction between parliamentarian and non-parliamentarian regimes.

[Table 2]

As is evident from table 2, parliamentarian party systems tend to be on average more institutionalized, less fragmented and display higher levels of PI than (semi-)presidential systems characterized by much less stable patterns of inter-party competition, extremely plural electorates and inchoate political parties. This is also visible when looking at the different waves of democratization with just one exception: post-WWII. Then, and even if more fragmented on average, both political parties and party systems present higher level of institutionalization in semi-presidential than in parliamentary regimes, except for Malta. That this is the case, however, can be explained by the fact that all semi-presidential regimes included in this period had had previous experiences with democracy, either as independent states during the inter-war period (e.g. Austria and Finland) or as part of other more consolidated democracies (e.g. Iceland and Ireland as part of Denmark and the United Kingdom, respectively). Indeed, it has been proved by Remmer (1985), Pasquino (1990) or Rivera (1996) in Latin America, Southern and East Central Europe, respectively, that previous democratic experiences in which political parties/voters had enough time to establish a minimal level of interaction/identification facilitate the process of (both party and systemic) institutionalization at the onset of democracy after transition.

A second indicator of the destabilizing effect of (semi-presidentialism) and PSI relies on the fact that when ranked according to the three different indicators explained above, parliamentary party systems occupy with no exceptions the higher positions (see

[14] The ENEP is calculated according to Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) classic formula: $1/\Sigma v_i$, where v_i (v_i) is the proportion of votes of the ith party. AGE refers to the average age of those parties with at least 10 per cent of the vote in the last legislative elections. When electoral results were not available (e.g. during the French 2nd Republic, the Portuguese 1st Republic or the Spanish Restoration), the percentage of seats was taken into consideration.

[15] These are: pre-WWI, inter-war, post-WWII, the so-called "Third Wave", and the post-communist period.

table B in the Appendix). Moreover, when looking at the first ten party systems in each of the rankings, it is possible to observe that no less than seven belong to parliamentary regimes. At the other side of the rankings, non-parliamentary systems tend to be norm, with two exceptions: inter-war Latvia and Czechoslovakia. But even in this particular case more than half in the "low ten" are semi-presidential regimes.

All these results seem to confirm, in general, the negative impact (both direct and indirect) of certain regime types on the process of PSI, asking for a more in-depth examination of the relationship between these two variables. One way to do this is, and combining a MSSD and a MDSD research-design, to look at those cases experiencing a change in regime type. On the one hand, this allows to control for all those factors that could have affected the level of PSI (e.g. historical legacies, electoral system, cleavage structuration, economic development, etc.), while focusing on the only "causal condition" that varied, that is, the ToR. One the other hand, this enables to see if regime type change, common to all countries, equally affects the process of institutionalization in very diverse (culturally, economically, etc.) p. Looking at the countries showed in table A, there is a total of ten countries in which such change has taken place at least once. It is to the in-depth study of these democracies that we turn now on.

[Table 3]

Table 3 looks at the changes in electoral fragmentation and both party and systemic institutionalization in each of those ten countries. In particular, the table above looks not only at long-term, but also at medium- and short-terms effects. The idea is to be able to examine if the ToR has a (direct and indirect) impact on the degree of PSI independently of the time or period taken into consideration, especially bearing in mind the procedural character of the latter. However, and taking into consideration that the average party age is ill-suited for cross-temporal comparisons, I will employ here Lewis' Index of Party Stability (IPS) instead.[16] This indicator "weights and 'rewards' the electoral achievement of parties in a sequence of elections" through the progressive enhancement of the proportion of the total vote for political parties in a given election over time (2006, 574-575). In this sense, and taking notice not only of the stability in voters´ electoral preferences but also of the age of a party organization, the IPS captures the two central dimensions of PI altogether: namely, social *rootedness* and organizational *systemness* (Casal Bértoa, 2014).

[16] Both IPS and AGE (.634) are significantly correlated (at .01 level), in any case.

Building on the theoretical framework presented in section 3, the expectation is that (1) both iPSI and IPS should be higher and (2) the ENEP lower in parliamentarian than in (semi-)presidential regimes. A first look at table 3, which uses italics to mark when that is not the case, confirms that those three expectations are fulfilled in most instances. Thus, and with only one exception in each of the clusters, parliamentary party systems tend to be definitively less fragmented than their semi-presidential counterparts. Interestingly enough, and what is perhaps more striking, the introduction of (direct) presidential elections constituted an important earthquake for the fragmentation of the party systems in most countries. Thus, the ENEP in Austria, Iceland and Ireland increased in almost one point, while in Slovakia the difference was of three points and a half. In clear contrast, both the Estonian and Moldovan party systems experienced a remarkable concentration after the introduction of parliamentarism. In both cases, the ENEP decrease in more than two points in just three years.

A similar conclusion on the negative effects of semi-presidentialism for PSI can be adopted in relation to the level of PI. Indeed, IPS scores tend to be higher in parliamentary than in semi-presidential regimes with only one exception in the first two clusters (i.e. inter-war Finland) and two (i.e. Ireland and again inter-war Finland) when looking at long-terms effects. This should not come as a surprise because while in inter-war Finland/Ireland exactly the same five/three parties[17] have attracted roughly 90 per cent of the votes since as early as 1919/1937, most of the other countries experienced important organizational reshuffles at the beginning of their semi-presidential experiences. Slovakia, whose party system totally changed after the introduction of semi-presidentialism in 1999, constitutes the clearest example. In particular, 2002 saw the organizational restructuration of both the centre-left and the centre-right, with the appearance of Smer as a splinter from the Party of Democratic Left (SDL´) and the demise of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) with the foundation of the Slovak and Democratic Christian Union (SDKÚ) and the restoration of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH).

Similar instances of party change after the introduction of direct presidential elections can be observed in the rest of the countries under study. Thus, 1956 saw the beginning of the electoral decline of the Communist Party (KPÖ) and the dissolution of the Federation of Independents (VdU) in Austria, while the electoral eruption of the

[17] SDP, ML, RKP, KoK., and KE in inter-war Finland. FG, FF, LAB in Ireland.

People´s Alliance (AB) in Iceland. In the Weimar Republic the three most prominent parties at the beginning of the 1930s (i.e. the United Socialists, the Communists and the Nazis) only had their electoral baptism as late as May 1924. Even in Portugal the process of PI experienced an important shock with the foundation of the National Republic Party (PRN) by Sidónio Pais´ supporters in the running-up of the 1918 presidential elections. More recently (October 2013), the Czech Republic experienced the irruption of the Action for Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO), founded as recent as May 2011, as well as the electoral collapse of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS).

In terms of the level of PSI per se, it follows from table 3 that parliamentary party systems tend to become more institutionalized than (semi-)presidential ones. Thus, in most cases the iPSI clearly increases or decreases, respectively, after the (re-)introduction or abolition of parliamentarism. In some countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Finland, Portugal or Slovakia), the deterioration in the process of systemic institutionalization is certainly significant. This is not to say, however, that parliamentary systems always institutionalize faster than non-parliamentary ones (see "short-term effects"). But even in two of the cases, Austria and Iceland, higher iPSI scores after the introduction of (direct) presidential elections could be explained by the lack of governmental change until 1956 and 1966, respectively. Indeed, once the first cabinet alternation is taken into consideration the iPSI respectively falls to 96.4 and 80.6, both clearly below the level of PSI for those countries during parliamentarism.

All in all, table 3 seems to confirm our initial hypothesis that non-parliamentarian regimes are counterproductive, either directly or indirectly, for the process of systemic institutionalization. The results are even more striking if we take into consideration that, as scholars have repeatedly sustained (Huntington, 1968; Mainwaring, 1999; Mair, 1997), institutionalization is a process that requires time. As a result, both parties and party systems should display, no matter what, lower levels of institutionalization immediately following transition than when democratic government has been in place for some time. However, this is not the picture that follows from table 3, where both party and systemic institutionalization is higher at the time of democratic consolidation than afterwards. But this only seems to be the case in those countries that initially adopted a constitutional parliamentarian regime (e.g. Czech Republic Slovakia, Portugal) or managed to postpone the celebration of presidential elections (e.g. Austria, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Weimar Republic). And this independently of the amount of

time taken into consideration.[18] Contrarily, in those instances when a semi-presidential regime was initially adopted, the process of both party and systemic institutionalization was hindered until a more beneficial parliamentary regime was introduced (e.g. Estonia, Moldova).

A very similar conclusion can be drawn when taken into consideration the different periods as a whole. Thus, an because one could argue that it is unfair – as table 3 does - to separate into two totally different periods (non-parliamentarian and parliamentarian, or vice versa) what on the other hand is a unique party system, figure 1 displays the level of iPSI for the whole period in the ten cases of regime change under consideration, indicating (colored vertical line) the exact moment when such change took place.[19] As a result, and taking into consideration that later partisan interactions definitively benefit from previous experiences (temporal argument mentioned above), one would expect iPSI to be higher the longer the process of systemic institutionalization. Interestingly enough, however, this seems not the case in most instances. What can be observed, however, is that most party systems have experienced an important decline in the level of institutionalization immediately after the introduction of (direct) presidential elections.

As it clearly follows from figure 1, this was the case in the Czech Republic, Finland, Portugal, the Weimar Republic, Slovakia, or even in Ireland where the first so-called "inter-party government" could not be conceived without the results of the 1945 presidential elections. Even in Austria, where such immediate shock did not take place, the level of PSI clearly stagnates after the first direct presidential elections. Iceland, however, constitutes the only exception as not only the iPSI did not decrease, but it continued to increase after the first presidential elections in 1952. This, however, can be explained by the fact that Icelandic presidential candidates do not usually have a partisan character (Kristinsoon, 1999). As a result, it is not surprising that their impact on the structure of inter-party competition is lower than in the other countries here studied (see also table 3). On the contrary, and despite the initial shock, the Moldovan party system has exponentially institutionalized after the abolition of semi-

[18] Indeed, and not matter the fact that the semi-presidential period in post-WWII Austria, Finland and Slovakia taken into consideration clearly exceeds the number of years under parliamentarism, iPSI is higher during the latter. The only exception to this, for the reasons we will mention later or, is Iceland.

[19] Trying to dismiss the "endogeneity" problem (see section 2), it is important to note here that in all cases (with no exception) ToR change took place at the time party system were "institutionalizing". If the level of PSI were to have influenced the ToR, and not vice versa as I argue here, one would have expected regime change to have taken place at the time of systemic under-institutionalization.

presidentialism. A similar pattern could be observed in Portugal after parliamentarism was re-introduced in 1919.

Types of Regime and Party System Institutionalization: "Causal Mechanisms"

As it follows from the previous section, which analyses both the direct and indirect impact different regime types may have on the process of PSI, non-parliamentarian regimes have, in general a detrimental effect on the latter. However, and in order to understand how this is the case, in this section I will complement the previous analyses with a procedure particularly suitable to make out "the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable […] and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett, 2005: 296).

The idea is that, by breaking down the rather large process of systemic institutionalization into its constituent mechanisms, I can more easily identify the "chain of causation" leading from ToR to PSI. With such aim in mind, and using "process-tracing", I will proceed next to analyze the specific relationship the abovementioned variables may have in four different, although very representative, contemporary cases: one exclusively parliamentarian (Greece), one exclusively semi-presidential, one exclusively presidential (Cyprus), and three examples of regime change (Portugal, Moldova and Slovakia). Acting as real "control" cases, these latter three countries provide a "natural experiment" with which to examine how change in the ToR has influenced the level of PSI. Let´s examine now each of these six cases in turn.

In Greece the head of state is elected by the Hellenic Parliament for a five-year term, with the possibility of just one re-election. Because in order to be elected a presidential candidate needs either a qualified majority of two-thirds in the first two ballots or three-fifths in the third (and final) ballot, the larger legislative parties in general, and the governing party in particular, clearly dominate the elective process. As a result, all (partisan) presidents in Greece have been members of either PASOK or ND.

In terms of the mechanisms liking regime type and the structure of inter-party competition at the time of government formation, it clearly follows from table 4 that in Greece the head of state has always been elected either by the majoritarian governing party (until 1995, inclusive) or as a result of a compromise among governing and opposition forces (since 2000). In fact, even in those cases when the governing party did not have the necessary super-majority (i.e. 180 votes) to appoint the president in the

third ballot, PASOK´s collaboration with KKE (in 1985) or PA (in 1995) did not have a reflection at the legislative/governmental level.

All this clearly confirms my early expectations that in parliamentary regimes presidential (s)elections either reinforce the pre-existing structure of legislative competition or do not exert any influence, especially if the election of the head of state immediately precedes parliamentary elections (e.g. 1985 and 2000). And the same could be said in the case of any other parliamentary democracies: e.g. Albania, Hungary, Malta, Turkey, etc. (Casal Bértoa, 2012; forthcoming).

In clear contrast, the popular election of the Polish president for a five-year term, with the possibility of one re-election, in a majority runoff has always exerted, except for the last 2011 elections, a very negative effect on the process of PSI.

In clear contrast, the popular election of the Polish president for a five-year term, with the possibility of one re-election, in a majority runoff has always exerted, except for the last elections,[20] a very negative effect on the process of PSI. Thus, the November 1990 presidential elections played a critical role in shaping the structure of inter-party competition in Poland. Indeed, the confrontation between Wałęsa (Solidarity founder and leader) and Mazowiecki (Solidarity advisor and prime minister at the time) led to the decomposition of the centre-right (Solidarity) forces into two different camps: namely, Christian-democratic/conservative (heirs of those who supported Wałęsa) and liberal-democratic (heirs of those supporting Mazowiecki). Such division not only made difficult any stable interactions during the first 1991-1993 parliament, but also determined the political enmity characterising the relationships between the two camps.

The 1995 and 2000 presidential elections also had important consequences for the structure of inter-party competition in Poland. Thus, Wałęsa´s defeat against Kwaśniewski in November 1995 due to the disunity of the forces within the political right prompted these parties to "temporally" unite in the so-called Solidarity electoral Action (AWS) in order to contest the parliamentary elections in 1997 (Szczerbiak, 1999), and to collaborate "ephemerally" with the liberal Freedom Union (UW) from October 1997 up to June 2000. In the same vein, the 2000 presidential elections, where Kwaśniewski (non-partisan) enjoyed the formal support of his former party (SLD) but also from the post-Solidarity Labour Union (UP), brought forward the formal collaboration between these two parties in both an electoral (Millard, 2002: 362) and,

[20] Immediately following the "Smolensk" tragedy, the 2010 presidential elections had a rather special (i.e. less polarized) character.

later on, governmental alliance in 2001 (see appendix), putting to a certain extend an end to the so-called "post-communist" cleavage, and giving path to a new pattern of inter-party competition: one based more on economic, rather than cultural, divisions (Casal Bértoa, 2012: 462-463).

But it was during the 2005 October presidential campaign that the impact of presidential elections on the process of PSI became most clear. Indeed, the inclusion of two anti-establishment parties (i.e. Self-Defence and LPR) in first a legislative[21] and later governmental coalition in 2005/6 could not be explained without their explicit support to Lech Kaczyński´s presidential candidature, especially after his defeat at the hands of Tusk during the first round.[22] The formation of such "populist" coalition (PiS, SRP, LPR) constituted a clear blow to the previous structure of competition, characterised by the permanent exclusion of populist "anti-systemic" forces and the fierce opposition between post-communist and post-solidarity parties (Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2006; Szczerbiak, 2007).[23]

Interestingly enough, such negative impact in the stability of the structure of competition among Polish political parties has been reinforced by the temporal precedence of presidential over parliamentary elections in 1990, 1995 and 2000 and their "almost concurrent" character in 2005, when the contamination between the two campaigns clearly undermined the pre-existing impetus for a centre-right POPiS coalition government (Szczerbiak, 2007: 204).

All in all, it follows from the above that almost every Polish presidential election has brought with it a re-alignment of the political scene, providing "the potential for new axes of conflict without the mediating effect of long-established relationship among political parties" (Millard, 2000: 59). But a similar argument could be made in other semi-presidential democracies where the structure of partisan competition changed after previous collaboration at the time of presidential elections: namely, Croatia in 2000, Serbia and Ukraine in 2004, Bulgaria in 2005, Slovenia in 2008, etc. In

[21] The PSL, which also supported Kaczyński during the second round, also formed part of this first "parliamentary" coalition in what was otherwise the first time a post-communist party let its explicit support to a right-wing cabinet.

[22] It is important to note here that Andrzej Lepper, long-life leader of Self-Defence, had obtained roughly 15 per cent of the votes during the first-round. Conscious that his electoral support could get either Kaczyński or Tusk elected, he conditioned his support to participation in the government that was being negotiated. While the latter refused to any kind of collaboration, Jarosław Kaczyński, PiS leader and Lech´s twin-brother, did not.

[23] In September 2001 SLD gave some consideration to a governing coalition with Self-defence, although the idea was finally rejected due to the "anti-systemic" character of the latter. Other extreme political forces (e.g. KPN or ROP) had experienced a similar fate.

some countries, like Finland, "the main changes in […] politics have often been made in connection with presidential elections" (Paloheimo, 2001: 93).

Cyprus constitutes the only continuous presidential regime in our sample. Here, as is rather natural in multi-party presidential democracies (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, etc.), the composition of governmental coalitions has been always determined by the patterns of inter-party collaboration established at the time of presidential elections. This is clearly visible in table 4 which, displaying the party support at the time of presidential elections as well as the governmental composition, shows how all Cypriot presidents have continuously incorporated ministers belonging to the most important parties supporting their presidential bid at the time into their executives (Christophorou, 2008).

Among all the instances of regime change included in this study, inter-war Portugal represents the most fascinating case with two changes: namely, from parliamentarism to presidentialism and back. Moreover, it clearly demonstrates how a change in the ToR can have an immediate effect in the structure of partisan competition. Thus, while during 1911 and 1917 all Portuguese heads of state were (s)elected by the governing majority, either of the PRP or the PD, the introduction of a presidential regime in 1918 also brought with it a total change in the party system. Thus, the victory of Sidónio Pais´ party (i.e. PNR) in the (concurrent) April presidential and parliamentary elections temporarily[24] ended the "three-party (Democrats, Unionists and Evolutionist) system" inaugurated by the October revolution in 1910 (see table 4). Interestingly enough, and confirming our expectations, the re-introduction of the indirect election of the head of state after Pais´ assassination also re-instated the previous mechanism by which the presidential (s)elections was determined by the governing party, but the former did not have any influence on the latter. Thus even in the only case where the President (António José de Almeida) was elected with the (implicit) support of the governing Democratic Party (PD) such ad hoc collaboration did not have any impact on the structure of competition which continued to oppose the PD to the now Republican Libertal Party (PLR), a product of the merger between Unionists (PUR) and Evolutionists (PER).[25]

[24] After Pais´ assassination the indirect election of the head of state, and therefore parliamentarism, was re-introduced.

[25] Almost immediately after the new PLR president was appointed, there was an attempt by Fernandes Costa to form a new mono-color (PLR) cabinet but, following the logic of inter-party competition in parliamentary regimes, it was not successful.

Slovakia and Moldova can be considered two different sides of the same coin as both changed their regime type almost at the same time, but while the former changed parliamentarism for semi-presidentialism in 1999, the latter did the opposite just one year later. Notwithstanding this difference, and as it follows from table 4, all presidential (s)elections in both countries responded to the above-mentioned mechanisms of consensual agreement or super-majority. Thus, while Kovac was elected with the support of the two governing parties (HZDS and SNS) and the main opposition party (SDL´) (Goldman, 1999: 62-63; Malová, 1994: 416),[26] all Moldavian indirectly elected presidents were appointed with the super-majority of the governing coalition/party (2001, 2005 and 2012). Moreover, while the celebration of direct presidential elections created, as we will have the opportunity to see below, a window of opportunity in order to change the pre-existing patterns of partisan competition, both the disastrous presidential contests of 1998 (Slovakia) and 2009 (Moldova) did not modify, but simply responded to the existing structure of competition characterised by the rather polarized confrontation between the parties of the "semi-authoritarian" (HDZS and SNS) or "communist" (PCRM) government against the parties of the "democratic" opposition, respectively (Malová and Učeň, 1999: 503-504).[27]

The constitutional gridlock in Slovakia ended after the victory of the "democratic" opposition (i.e. SDK, SMK, SDL´ and SOP) in the September 1998 legislative elections and the January 1999 constitutional reform providing for the popular election of the president (Malová and Láštic, 2001). The timing (roughly eight months difference) and sequence (parliamentary-presidential) of both legislative and presidential elections definitively explains why the first direct presidential elections still responded to the previous dichotomous pattern of competition: namely, Mečiarists versus anti-Mečiarists. Still, the 1999 presidential elections did not but to keep alive a pattern of interaction that otherwise would have disappeared as the result of simple partisan contestation in parliament due to the significant ideological differences within the coalition. This is what simply happened in 2002 (see figure 1).

In any case, and as soon as both the timing and sequence of the Slovak elections changed (see table 4), presidential elections started to exert their "destabilizing" influence on the process of systemic institutionalization as it opened and opportunity for

[26] Because the SDL´ made its support conditional on the president´s non-partisan position during his term in office, Kováč immediately suspended his party membership after the election.

[27] Such structure of competition was not changed even when the PCRM needed of the complementary support of other minor parties in 2005.

new patterns of collaboration/cooperation to emerge. Thus, the rapprochement between nationalistic (SNS and HZDS´ splinter parties) and left-leaning forces (Smer) in 2006 would have been unthinkable without their joint support to Gašparovič´s candidature in 2004. Indeed, it was this close electoral collaboration that favoured the formation of the populist-nationalistic coalition government between Smer, SNS and HZDS two years later.[28] In a similar vein, Radicová´s 2010 multi-party coalition cabinet could have already been foreseen at the time of the 2009 presidential elections when SDKÚ, SaS, KDH and Most decided to support Radicová´s presidential-bid during the second-round (Rybář, 2010).

In a similar vein, the 1996 (direct) presidential elections in Moldova also impacted the existing structure of inter-party competition, which pitted the opposition against the agrarian-bureaucratic PDAM, in four major ways. First of all, the electoral confrontation between the President (Snegur), the Premier (Shangeli) and the Speaker of the Parliament (Lucinschi), all of them with direct or indirect links to PDAM, clearly provoked its electoral decline in 1998 (3.6 per cent of the vote in contrast to 43.2 in 1994) and the formation of Snegur´s CDM and pro-Lucinschi´s PMDP (Quinlan, 2002:83-84). Secondly, it pushed President Lucinschi, who had ran as an independent candidate,[29] to collaborate with his former party (i.e. PDAM) at the time of Ciubuc´s appointment as Premier in January 1997 as a kind of compensation for PDAM´s support during the second round of the presidential contest (EECR, 1997: 19; Roper, 2008: 115).[30] Thirdly, the rather successful Communist comeback in 1998 could not have been possible, or at least was clearly pushed, by Voronin´s (PCRM´s leader) surprising electoral performance – he came third with 10 per cent of the votes - at the first round of the November 1996 presidential elections. Last but not least, and as Roper (2008) has noticed, Snegur´s defeat at Lucinschi´s hands clearly complicated the governmental collaboration between their two supportive political forces (i.e. PMDP and PRDM/CDM, respectively).

Conclusions

[28] Even in the event of Meciar´s victory in the presidential contest, mainly thanks to the "tacit" support of the governing parties at the time, mainly SDKÚ and ANO (Rybář, 2005:336), the structure of inter-party competition would have been drastically altered as it would have facilitated the rapprochement between HZDS and SDKÚ and its collaboration in an eventual minority government, desired by the two parts (Malová and Rybář, 2008).

[29] PDAM did not support Lucinschi during the first round, but Shangeli.

[30] It should be borne in mind that PDAM had already lost its absolute majority by the time.

In general, scholars have failed to predict the implications that the ToR in general, and the popular election of the president in particular, can have for the process of PSI. One obvious reason for this has been a tendency to focus on the powers of the head of state rather than on his/her mode of election. Following the most recent scholarship and departing from Elgie (1999), I have adopted a minimal definition of the different regime types that focuses solely on the way the head of state and/or government are elected. This has the advantage of avoiding any reference to their constitutional powers which, in any case, have proven to be not at all related with the process of PSI.

Building on my previous work (Casal Bértoa 2012, forthcoming) and assuming that both electoral fragmentation and party under-institutionalization hinder PSI, the article suggest two mechanisms by which different regime types may affect and/or alter the process of institutionalization, with a special focus on European party systems. The first mechanism points to the negative effect of the popular election of the president on the number of electoral parties and their institutionalization, affecting systemic institutionalization only indirectly. On the one hand, party system size is expected to escalate in (semi-)presidential regimes, but only in the case of majority run-off and/or non-concurrent presidential elections. On the other hand, the ability of popular presidential elections to encourage political outsiders as well as non-party candidates to stand for election not only increases electoral fragmentation, but more specifically contributes to promote partisan factionalism and personalization of politics with the well-known negative consequences this has for the process of PI itself (Samuels and Shugart, 2010).

The second mechanism, definitively the main discovery of the article, points to a direct link between ToR and PSI. In particular, I sustain that the double electoral process typical of non-parliamentary regimes which requires from any presidential candidate a broader electoral base, in most cases even across ideological lines, creates a "window of opportunity" for a change in the pre-existing structure of competition. In other words, while in parliamentary regime the indirect (s)election of the head of state may reinforce, or not affect, the process of systemic institutionalization, the popular election of the head of state in (semi-)presidential regimes introduces the potential for new patterns of interaction among the various political forces which, in turn, will have a (negative) impact on the level of systemic institutionalization *per se*. The extent of such

adverse effect will depend though on the particular institutional arrangements adopted (i.e. timing and sequence) as well as on personal agency (i.e. coalition bargaining).[31]

After confirming that electoral concentration and both party and systemic institutionalization is higher in parliamentary than (semi-)presidential regimes in general, but also in most democratic waves in particular, the article proceeds to test the above-cited propositions in 10 "regime change" cases. Combining both a MSSD and a MDSD, and examining three different points in time, my analysis demonstrates how both parties and party systems, even within the same country, tend to become (almost immediately) less institutionalized and more fragmented after direct presidential elections are introduced. And the same is true when different party systems, in both time (pre- vs. post-WWII) and space (Western vs. Eastern Europe), are compared.

Finally, an in-depth analysis of the mechanisms directly linking regime type and PSI in six "representative" case-studies reveals that while in Greece, Portugal (until 1917 and after 1919), Slovakia (until 1999) and Moldova (after 2001), presidential (s)elections not only followed but also reinforced the existing structure of partisan competition, in Poland, Cyprus, Slovakia (after 2002) and Moldova (until 2000) the popular election of the president gave party elites in most cases an opportunity to experiment with new patterns of interaction, putting innovative forms of collaboration/cooperation to the test. The result was a "de-institutionalizing" effect, boosted by the combination of non-concurrent and majority run-off presidential elections.

All in all, and bearing in mind all what has been said, it seems that parliamentarian regimes have been better suited for the institutionalization of European party systems. This is not to say that either presidentialism or semi-presidentialism should be avoided, only that they are more risk-prone regimes.

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[31] As political parties/elites may decide not to size such opportunity.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1. Regime-related outcomes for party system institutionalization

Type of regime	**Indirect effects on…**				**Direct effects on…**		
	Electoral fragmentation (ENEP)			*PI*	*Structure of competition*		
Parliamentarism	n/a	n/a	+	+	n/a	+	0
(Semi-)presidentialism	+	-	-	-	-	0	-
Electoral timing	*Concurrent*	*Non-concurrent*		n/a	*Concurrent*	*Non-concurrent*	
Electoral system	*Plurality*	*Majority*	*Plurality*	**Electoral**		*Parliam.-*	*President.-*

		(run-off)		**sequence**	*President.*	*Parliam.*

Notes: "+" = positive effect; "-" = negative effect; "0" = non-effect; "n/a" = not available.

Table 2. ToR regime (direct and indirect) effects

Period	**Parliamentarism**			**(Semi-)presidentialism**		
(n. of cases)	iPSI	ENEP	AGE	iPSI	ENEP	AGE
1848-1914 (9)	86.8	3.2	22.9	46.3	n/a	1.4
1917-1939 (17)	84.2	5.3	29.5	73.1	6	29.1
1945-1973 (15)	87.3	3.6	36.6	*92.1*	3.9	*45.7*
1974-1989 (5)	92	*3.7*	36.2	89.4	3.4	30.6
1990-2014 (27)	88.5	4.7	20.7	84.4	5.6	12.3
TOTAL (73)	**86.9**	**4.4**	**28.5**	**82.5**	**5**	**20.3**

Note: In italics those cases contradicting the hypotheses.
Source: Own calculations.

Table 4. Presidential (s)elections and legislative coalitions in six European countries

Legislative elections*	**Government Parties**	**Presidential (s)elections**	**"Presidential" coalition***
Greece (parliamentarism)			
Nov. 1974	ND	June 1975	ND
Nov. 1977	ND	May 1980	ND
Oct. 1981	PASOK	March 1985	PASOK-KKE
June 1985	PASOK		
July 1989	ND-SYN		
April 1990	ND	May 1990	ND
Oct. 1993	PASOK	March 1995	PASOK-PA
Sept. 1996	PASOK	March 2000	ND-PASOK
April 2000	PASOK		
March 2004	ND	March 2005	ND-PASOK
Sept. 2007	ND		
Oct. 2009	PASOK	Feb. 2010	PASOK-ND-LAOS
June 2012	ND		
Poland (semi-presidentialism)			
Oct. 1991	ZChN-PC-PL	Dec. 1990	PC-ZChN-PL-KLD…
Sept. 1993	SLD-PSL		
Sept. 1997	AWS (ZChN-SKL-PC-PChD...)-UW	Nov. 1995	SLD
Sept. 2001	SLD/UP-PSL	Oct. 2000	SLD-UP
Sept. 2005	PiS-SO-LPR	Oct. 2005	PiS-LPR(-SO)
Oct. 2007	PO-PSL	June 2010	PO
Oct. 2011	PO-PSL	2015	n/a
Cyprus (presidentialism)			
May 1981	DIKO	Jan. 1978	DIKO
March 1983	DIKO	Feb. 1983	DIKO-AKEL
March 1988	Non-partisan	Feb. 1988	AKEL-EDEK
March 1993	DISY-DIKO	Feb. 1993	DISY-DIKO
March 1998	DISY-EDI-EDEK-LP	Feb. 1998	DISY-EDI-NEO-LP
March 2003	DIKO-AKEL-EDEK	Feb. 2003	DIKO-AKEL-EDEK-KOP
March 2008	AKEL-DIKO-EDEK-Epalxi	Feb. 2008	AKEL-DIKO-EDEK-KOP
March 2013	DISY-DIKO-Evroko	Feb. 2013	DISY-DIKO-Evroko
Portugal (parliamentarism)			
May 1911	PRP (i.e. PRE-PUR)	Aug. 1911	PRP (i.e. PRE-PUR)
		May 1915	PD
June 1915	PD	Aug. 1915	PD
Portugal (presidentialism)			

April 1918	PNR	April 1918	PNR
Portugal (parliamentarism)			
May 1919	PD	Aug. 1919	PLR
July 1921	PLR		
Jan. 1922	PD	Aug. 1923	PD
Nov. 1925	PD	Dec. 1925	PD
Slovakia (parliamentarism)			
June 1992	HZDS-SNS	Feb. 1993	HZDS (-SNS-SDL´)
Oct. 1994	HZDS-SNS-ZRS		
Sept.1998	SDK-SDL´-SMK-SOP	March 1998	vacant
Slovakia (semi-presidentialism)			
Sept. 2002	SDKU-KDH-SMK-ANO	May 1999	SDK-SDL´-SMK-SOP
		April 2004	HZD-LS(-SNS-Smer)
June 2006	Smer-HZDS-SNS	April 2009	HZD-Smer-SNS
June 2010	SDKÚ-Sas-KDH-Most		
March 2012	Smer	March 2014	n/a
Moldova (semi-presidentialism)			
April 1994	PDAM	Dec.1991 (no democracy)	Independent
May 1998	CDM-PMDP-PFD	Dec. 1996	PDAM-PSMUE
Moldova (parliamentarism)			
April 2001	PCRM	April 2001	PCRM
April 2005	PRCM	April 2005	PCRM-PPCD-PSL-PDM
April 2009	PCRM	June 2009	vacant
Sept. 2009	PLDM-PL-PDM-PAMN	Dec.2009	vacant
Nov. 2010	PLDM-PL-PDM	Jan. 2012	PLDM-PL-PDM-PSRM

* In the case of Cyprus, it refers to the date in which the cabinet was appointed.
Note: The party of the president is underlined. Parties providing support are in brackets.
Sources: Casal Bértoa (2012 and forthcoming)

Table 3. Type of regime change effects

Country	Type of Regime	Short-term effects				Medium-term effects				Long-term effects			
		Year	iPSI	ENEP	IPS	Period (years)	iPSI	ENEP	IPS	Period (years)	iPSI	ENEP	IPS
Austria	P	1949	98.1	2.8	98.6	1946-1952 (6)	98.9	2.5	98.6	1946-1952 (6)	98.9	2.5	98.6
	Sp	1953	*100*	2.8	98.4	1953-1959 (6)	*100*	2.6	97.9	1953-1975 (22)	97.2	2.5	97.8
Czech R.	P	2010	87	6.8	81.7	1993-1996 (3)	100	6.3	79.6	1993-2013 (20)	87.3	5.5	81.7
	Sp	2014	33.3	7.6	76.8	2014 (1)	33.3	7.6	76.8	2014 (1)	33.3	7.6	76.8
Estonia	Sp	1992	n/a	8.8	57.5	1992 (1)	n/a	8.8	57.5	1992 (1)	n/a	8.8	57.5
	P	1995	78.8	5.9	n/a	1993-1995 (2)	78.8	n/a	69.1	1993-2014 (19)	86.3	5.6	80.1
Finland	P	1924	81.1	5.3	88.2	1917-1922 (5)	78.9	4.3	85.8	1917-1924 (7)	81.1	4.6	88.2
	Sp	1927	62.9	*5*	*89.8*	1925-1930 (5)	71.9	5	*90.7*	1925-1930 (5)	71.9	5	*90.7*
	P	1948	87	4.9	98.6	1945-1949 (4)	89.6	5	98.6	1945-1949 (4)	89.6	5	98.6
	Sp	1951	54.2	5	98.2	1950-1954 (4)	68.5	5	98	1950-1973 (22)	82.8	5.5	95.1
Iceland	P	1949	82.2	3.6	98.7	1944-1952 (8)	83.3	3.6	98.7	1944-1952 (8)	83.3	3.6	98.7
	Sp	1953	*100*	4.2	96.2	1953-1961 (8)	83	3.7	92.8	1953-1976 (22)	*91.7*	3.7	92.2
Ireland	P	1944	96.8	3.3	75.3	1923-1934 (11)	93.9	3.8	79.5	1923-1947 (22)	97.2	3.5	75.3
	Sp	1948	33.3	4.1	74.4	1948-1958 (11)	93.4	*3.5*	75.3	1948-1971 (22)	97	*3.3*	*77.7*
Moldova	Sp	1998	83.3	5.8	49.7	1994-2000 (6)	88.9	4.9	49.7	1994-2000 (6)	88.9	4.9	49.7
	P	2001	*33.3*	3.5	56.7	2001-2007 (6)	90.5	3.4	63.6	2001-2014 (12)	89.2	3.5	72
Portugal	P	1915	77.1	n/a	n/a	1911 (1)	60	n/a	n/a	1911-1917 (6)	77.1	n/a	n/a
	Pr.	1918	33.3	n/a	n/a	1918 (1)	33.3	n/a	n/a	1918 (1)	33.3	n/a	n/a
	P	1919	33.3	n/a	n/a	1919-1920 (2)	42.9	n/a	n/a	1919-1925 (6)	73.7	n/a	n/a
Slovakia	P	1998	82.1	5.3	68.2	1993-2001 (8)	88	5.5	68.2	1993-2001 (8)	88	5.5	68.2
	Sp	2002	40.9	8.9	66.2	2002-2010 (8)	82.8	6.8	67.7	2002-2014 (11)	87.2	6.2	66.1
Weimar R.	P	1924	73.6	6.5	91.8	1919-1924 (5)	73.6	6.2	93.4	1919-1925J (6)	70	6.3	91.8
	Sp	1928	71.7	6.7	89.2	1925O-1929 (4)	72	6.7	89.2	1925O-1931 (6)	*74.3*	7	88.1

Notes: P = Parliamentarism; Sp = Semi-presidentialism; Pr. = Presidentialism. In italics all those instances contradicting the theoretical hypotheses.
Source: Own calculations

Figure 1. Regime Change and Party System Institutionalization in Europe over Time



Source: Own calculations

Appendix

Table A. European democracies by regime type (1848-2014)

Country	Period	ToR	Country	Period	ToR
Albania	2002-2014	P	Kosovo	2008-2014	P
Andorra	1993-2014	P	Latvia	1920-1933 (I)	P
Austria	1920-1932 (I)	P		1993-2014 (II)	P
	1946-1952 (II)	P	Liechtenstein	1993-2014	P
	1953-1976 (III)	Sp	Lithuania	1993-2014	Sp
Belgium	1919-1943	P	Luxembourg	1920-1944	P
Bulgaria	1990-2014	Sp	Macedonia	1992-2014	Sp
Croatia	2000-2014	Sp	Malta	1964-1988	P
Cyprus	1978-2002	Pr	Moldova	1994-2000 (I)	Sp
Czechoslovakia	1918-1938 (I)	P		2001-2014 (II)	P
	1945-1946 (II)	P	Montenegro	2007-2014	Sp
Czech Republic	1993-2013 (I)	P	The Netherlands	1918-1942	P
	2014 (II)	Sp	Norway	1905-1929	P
Denmark	1911-1934	P	Poland	1918-1926 (I)	P
Estonia	1921-1934 (I)	P		1991-2014 (II)	Sp
	1992 (II)	Sp	Portugal	1911-1917 (I)	P
	1993-2014 (III)	P		1918 (II)	Pr
Finland	1919-1924 (I)	P		1919-1925 (III)	P
	1925-1930 (II)	Sp		1976-2000 (IV)	Sp
	1945-1949 (III)	P	Romania	1996-2014	Sp
	1950-1973 (IV)	Sp	Russia	1999-2006	Sp
France	1848-1850 (I)	Sp	San Marino	1993-2014	P
	1876-1899 (II)	P	Serbia	2001-2014	Sp
	1946-1957 (III)	P	Slovakia	1993-2001 (I)	P
	1968-1992 (IV)	Sp		2002-2014 (II)	Sp
Georgia	2004-2014	Sp	Slovenia	1993-2014	Sp
Germany	1919-1925J (I)	P	Spain	1900-1923 (I)	P
	1925O-1932 (II)	Sp		1931-1936 (II)	P
	1949-1973 (III)	P		1979-2003 (III)	P
Greece	1946-1948 (I)	P	Sweden	1917-1941	P
	1975-1998 (II)	P	Switzerland	1897-1921	P
Hungary	1990-2014	P	Turkey	1946-1953 (I)	P
Iceland	1944-1952 (I)	P		1961-1979 (II)	P
	1953-1976 (II)	Sp		1983-2007 (III)	P
Ireland	1923-1945 (I)	P	Ukraine	2002-2014	Sp
	1948-1971 (II)	Sp	United Kingdom	1919-1943	P
Italy	1948-1972	P			

Note: P = Parliamentarism; Sp = Semi-presidentialism; Pr. = Presidentialism.

Table B. iPSI, ENEP and PI in 73 European regimes (1848-2014)

Party system	iPSI	Party system	ENEP	Party system	AGE
Austria II	98.9	Turkey I	1.8	Liechtenstein	85
Switzerland	98.8	Georgia	2.3	Belgium	74.3
Montenegro	97.7	Malta	2.3	Spain III	67
Austria III	97.2	Liechtenstein	2.4	Malta	64
Ireland I	97.2	Austria II	2.5	Germany III	62
Malta	97.2	Austria III	2.5	Austria III	58.5
Ireland II	97.0	France II	2.5	Finland IV	55.3
Liechtenstein	96.1	Greece I	2.7	UK	54

Greece II	95.4	France I	2.8	Denmark	46.7
UK	95.0	Greece II	2.8	Ireland II	45.3
Spain III	94.5	Austria I	2.9	Spain I	43
Georgia	93.9	UK	3.1	Iceland II	40.3
The Netherlands	93.9	Ireland II	3.2	Italy	40
Norway	92.7	Switzerland	3.2	Turkey II	37
Denmark	92.4	Andorra	3.3	Cyprus	35.7
Kosovo	92.1	Cyprus	3.3	Germany II	35.3
France IV	92.0	Montenegro	3.3	Greece I	34.7
Iceland II	91.7	Portugal II	3.4	Czechoslovakia II	34
Hungary	91.1	Turkey II	3.4	Luxembourg	34
Andorra	91.1	Ireland I	3.5	The Netherlands	33.7
Belgium	91.0	Moldova II	3.5	Norway	32.8
Portugal II	90.9	Norway	3.5	Austria I	32.3
Ukraine	90.5	Belgium	3.6	Finland III	32.3
Turkey I	90.5	Iceland I	3.6	Spain II	30
Albania	89.9	Luxembourg	3.6	Germany I	29.8
Luxembourg	89.9	Spain III	3.6	France IV	29
Finland III	89.6	Denmark	3.7	Sweden	29
Germany III	89.6	Germany III	3.7	Czechoslovakia I	28.8
Romania	89.3	Iceland II	3.7	France III	27.7
Moldova II	89.2	Italy	3.9	Iceland I	27.3
Macedonia	89.0	Sweden	3.9	Portugal II	25.5
Sweden	89.0	Macedonia	4.1	Austria II	24.7
Moldova I	88.9	Bulgaria	4.2	San Marino	23.7
Italy	88.8	Romania	4.3	Finland II	22.8
Slovenia	88.6	San Marino	4.3	Croatia	22.5
Czechoslovakia I	88.5	Spain II	4.3	Greece II	22
Spain I	88.1	Hungary	4.4	Albania	21
Slovakia I	88.0	Finland I	4.6	Turkey III	19.7
Croatia	87.9	France IV	4.7	Hungary	18.7
Cyprus	87.9	Serbia	4.8	Turkey I	18.5
Bulgaria	87.3	Turkey III	4.8	Macedonia	18
Czech Republic I	87.3	Moldova I	4.9	Lithuania	17
Slovakia II	87.2	Finland II	5	Estonia III	16.8
Austria I	87.0	Finland III	5	Bulgaria	16.7
Estonia III	86.3	Kosovo	5	Latvia I	16.5
Turkey III	86.2	Croatia	5.1	Serbia	16.3
France II	84.4	Czechoslovakia II	5.1	Switzerland	16.3
San Marino	83.7	Ukraine	5.2	Czech Republic I	16
Lithuania	83.5	France III	5.4	Moldova II	14.3
Serbia	83.3	Czech Republic I	5.5	Slovenia	14.3
Iceland I	83.3	Finland IV	5.5	Finland I	14.2
Russia	83.0	Slovakia I	5.5	Kosovo	13.8
Finland IV	82.8	Albania	5.6	Poland I	13.8
Poland II	82.5	Estonia III	5.6	Czech R. II	13.3
Turkey II	81.4	Poland I	5.6	Montenegro	13
Finland I	81.1	Slovenia	6.1	Slovakia II	13
France III	79.1	Slovakia II	6.2	Ukraine	12.4
Spain II	78.9	Germany I	6.3	Ireland I	12.3
Latvia II	78.8	The Netherlands	6.4	Russia	11
Latvia I	78.1	Poland II	6.5	Estonia I	10.7
Portugal I	77.1	Estonia I	6.6	Romania	9.8

Greece I	74.6	Latvia II	6.7	France II	9.3
Germany II	74.3	Germany II	7	Slovakia I	8
Portugal III	73.7	Lithuania	7.1	Poland II	7.7
Estonia I	72.1	Czech R. II	7.6	Portugal III	7.5
Finland II	71.9	Estonia II	8.8	Andorra	6.5
Germany I	70.0	Russia	8.9	Georgia	5.5
Poland I	67.6	Latvia I	9.1	Moldova I	5
France I	59.3	Czechoslovakia I	10.5	Portugal I	5
Czech R. II	33.3	Portugal I	n/a	Latvia II	4
Portugal II	33.3	Portugal II	n/a	France I	2.7
Czechoslovakia II	n/a	Portugal III	n/a	Estonia II	1.8
Estonia II	n/a	Spain I	n/a	Portugal II	0