By Vlastimil Havlík (Masaryk University and National Institute SYRI) and Jakub Wondreys (Hannah Arendt Institute for Totalitarianism Studies at the TU Dresden and CEVRO University)

The Czech general election held last week closed a turbulent four-year period marked by multiple crises. These years tested the surprising winner of the 2021 election – a government formed by two electoral coalitions that joined forces to overcome political fragmentation, the majoritarian bias of the Czech electoral system and present as challengers to incumbent populist party ANO.

On one side stood SPOLU (Together), a right-wing conservative alliance of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), TOP 09, and the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL). On the other was the liberal-centrist coalition of the Czech Pirate Party (Pirates) and Mayors and Independents (STAN). Despite their ideological differences, both coalitions ran in 2021 on a anti-populist platform, claiming that their main rivals – the populist ANO of then-Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) – posed a major threat to democracy and leaned dangerously “Eastward” (toward Russia and China).
This negative, polarizing anti-populist message helped the two coalitions bridge their internal divides and form a comfortable majority government (108 out of 200 seats) under Prime Minister Petr Fiala (ODS/SPOLU). However, the coalition’s unity didn’t last. Tensions over the slow progress of public sector digitalization – the Pirates’ flagship agenda – led the party to leave the government in October 2024. Despite the cabinet reshuffle and a few corruption scandals (including the so-called Bitcoin affair that forced the justice minister to resign), the Fiala government managed to complete its term.

Campaign Themes: Crises and Polarization
Two major crises defined both the government’s performance and the 2025 campaign. The first was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Fiala’s cabinet firmly positioned itself as a pro-Western government, strongly supporting Ukraine and welcoming Ukrainian refugees. The second crisis stemmed from the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy price surge, which together triggered record inflation and a sharp drop in real wages. By 2025, Czechia was the only EU member state where real wages had fallen compared to 2019 (Eurostat).
Throughout the term, the party system remained stable – yet deeply divided. Two opposing blocs crystallized: the governing anti-populist camp and the populist and radical opposition, both maintaining surprisingly consistent levels of support.
SPOLU largely repeated its 2021 playbook. Its campaign focused on warning voters about the alleged pro-Russian and anti-democratic tendencies of ANO, SPD, and the new Enough! (Stačilo!) coalition led by the Communist Party. The campaign leaned heavily on anti-communist and geopolitical narratives – “Let’s not have communists ruling us again” and “Don’t let the path to the West become one to the East” were typical slogans for the coalition. While SPOLU did reference government achievements, the overall tone remained negative and moralistic: “Now it’s time to be on the right side.”
STAN, meanwhile, also used anti-populist rhetoric but combined it with liberal and pragmatic themes – support for same-sex marriage, euthanasia, and a focus on expertise and problem-solving. Its manifesto, The Good Program: For a Good Life in Our Country, tried to present STAN as a constructive, solutions-oriented force and a moderate counterbalance to SPOLU, while distancing itself from the Bitcoin scandal linked to SPOLU figures.
After leaving the government, the Pirates – who had included several Green candidates on their lists – struggled to stay above the 5% threshold in polls. Yet being in opposition gave the party a new lease on life. They positioned themselves as the only genuine democratic opposition, combining anti-populist arguments with a focus on modernization, the use of renewable energy, digital transformation, and socially liberal policies aimed at younger voters and families (affordable housing, childcare).
Throughout the term, populist ANO consistently led the polls, hovering around 30%. Once a technocratic, anti-corruption movement built around Babiš’s image as a “competent businessman,” ANO’s discourse has shifted closer to the radical right (also joining the newly formed European Parliament group of Patriots for Europe alongside radical right parties such as French National Rally or Freedom Party of Austria). The party adopted soft Eurosceptic and sovereigntist tones, occasionally flirting with xenophobic and anti-immigration messages. Economically, ANO moved leftwards, promising wage hikes for teachers, police, and firefighters, as well as higher pensions – selective, clientelist appeals to key voter groups. On foreign policy, Babiš struck a cautious tone, mindful of his electorate’s diversity regarding the war in Ukraine. The party did not doubt the membership of the country in the EU or NATO.
On the radical left, the Communist Party (which failed to enter parliament in 2021) became the backbone of the new Enough! (Stačilo!) coalition. Joined by smaller parties like the Czech National Socialist Party and the Czech Social Democratic Party, it ran on a hard anti-government, anti-Western, and pro-Russian platform – a mix of anti-capitalism, anti-NATO stance and hard Euroscepticism (calling for Czexit) that drove away many traditional social democrats from the party.
On the radical right, SPD built an alliance with smaller radical right parties – Svobodní, PRO, and Tricolour – placing their candidates on SPD’s list. Their campaign combined hard Euroscepticism (including calls for a Czexit referendum), anti-immigration and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, and a protectionist welfare agenda. In practice, SPD’s messaging was remarkably similar to that of the radical left coalition Enough!
Finally, there was the newcomer Motorists (AUTO), who had already made waves in the European Parliament elections (then in coalition with the Oath movement). AUTO campaigned against the Green Deal, defending combustion engines and traditional industries, while promoting a right-wing economic agenda. Although not overtly populist, the party presented itself as a fierce government critic and potential post-election partner for ANO, while rejecting cooperation with Enough! and – to a lesser extent – SPD. Lacking any strong nativist themes, AUTO tried to carve out a distinct identity on the opposition side.

Results
The results mostly confirmed what various polls had predicted. However, it would be an overstatement to claim that everything went as expected. Mainly, while ANO’s victory was widely anticipated, it was by no means certain whether Babis’s party, and especially its “friendly forces” (AUTO, SPD, and potentially Enough!), would secure enough support to form a coalition government. The extent to which Babis managed to win this election is hence the first major surprise. ANO obtained nearly 35% of vote shares and 80 seats. Compared to 2021, this represents an increase of almost 8 percentage points and over 27% increase. Overall, ANO received almost half a million more votes than in the previous election.
This leads us to another important point. We would have expected that increase in turnout (nearly 69% compared to 65.5% in 2021), driven in part by the introduction of correspondence voting (which ANO, SPD, and Enough! strongly opposed, clearly envisioning it may harm their prospects), would benefit the incumbent coalition. Yet, given the marked increase in the number of ANO’s voters, this was not the case. Instead, it appears that mobilization effort led by Babis and ANO was highly successful, bringing nearly every potential supporter to the polls. The first key takeway of the resutls, therefore, is that ANO managed to mobilize its electorate extremely efficiently and overperformed relative to expectation.
Second, in terms of ANO’s “friendly forces”, the election brought both somewhat expected and unexpected results. As later polls suggest, AUTO managed to surpass the electoral threshold, and did so by a slightly larger margin than anticipated, securing nearly 7% of the vote and 13 seats. Enough! and SPD, by contrast, significantly underperformed. Especially the former, despite being expected to enter parliament fairly easily, remained below the threshold, gaining only slightly more than 4% of vote shares. The latter fared better but still fell short of its initial ambition to challenge the governing STAN party for the position of the third-largest party, an outcome that some polls had even deemed possible. Conversely, compared to 2021, SPD lost support, obtaining less than 8% of the vote and winning 15 seats, a loss of 5, and finishing even behind the Pirates (which thus fulfilled one of their pre-election goals). This drop is even more pronounced when considering that SPD ran in a de facto coalition with other parties that, in 2021, secured close to 3% of the vote (and that is not including PRO). This means that, rather than an 18% decrease, the result could also be interpreted as a dramatic 37% decline.
There are several possible explanations for the underperformance of these two most radical forces. Here, we mainly argue that their messaging, particularly the emphasis on exiting from the EU and NATO (but potentially also overly explicit support of Putin’s Russia), was simply too extreme for most opposition voters, who thus largely opted for ANO or, in some cases, AUTO. In other words, both parties failed to mobilize beyond their electoral core. Still, the combined 28 seats won by AUTO and SPD give Babiš a solid prospect of forming a government and have, in effect, sealed the incumbent coalition’s defeat. In particular, AUTO’s result is a good news for Babiš, as it spares him from having to cooperate with the highly problematic and overly extreme Enough! or (arguably) to concede too much to an overly strong SPD.
This brings us to the so-called pro-(liberal) democratic forces. As noted, the election concluded with the somewhat expected defeat of the senior coalition partner, SPOLU. Nevertheless, the result has to still be a disappointment for SPOLU and Prime Minister Fiala, who even lost in his home region of Jihomoravský kraj, where he had defeated ANO in 2021. The party managed to win only in Prague, but even there it lost almost 8 percentage points compared to 2021 (a decrease of around 15%). Strikingly, among the larger urban centers, SPOLU won (aside from Prague) only in Brno, losing in every city with more than 100,000 inhabitants. This suggests only a limited effect of the rural-urban divide, also considering, for instance, that in the country’s third-largest city, Ostrava, SPOLU secured less than 18% of the vote (compared to ANO’s staggering 43.6%).
This thus hints that the party, plagued by aforementioned corruption scandals and the government’s subpar economic performance, was not able to mobilize its disillusioned voters. The public’s disappointment with the government was also reflected in the preferential vote, which led to several key party figures, including Finance Minister Stanjura, losing their seats. It also appears that the anti-populist, anti-Babis and sometimes exaggerated anti-Russian threat messaging that again dominated Fiala’s largely negative campaign was not successful this time. This arguably also generally suggests that voters are less receptive to such appeals when the government record is rather poor and an overall credibility of the main government party is undermined. Just a couple of days after the election, Fiala announced that he would not seek re-election as the ODS chairman. Given the fact that the project of SPOLU was strongly tied to Fiala, the future of the coalition and the course of the conservative parties remains unclear.
Turning to the remaining two parties, the junior member of the incumbent coalition, STAN, performed largely as expected, winning slightly over 11% of vote shares and securing 22 seats. With its more positive campaign, the party arguably maximized its potential. However, this also indicates that expanding its electoral support beyond this level is unlikely within the current Czech party system. Considering party leader Rakušan’s ambitions to become prime minister, the result can thus still be regarded as somewhat disappointing, revealing that most voters are not yet prepared to support a “third party.” On a more positive note, the election brought symbolic successes for STAN, such as the election of Julie Smejkalová, the youngest woman ever elected to the Czech parliament at age 21.
Finally, the result of the Pirate Party, nearly 9% of the vote and 18 seats (its second-best after the 2017 election), may not be as surprising in light of the most recent pre-election polls, but it nonetheless represents a significant success. This is particularly notable given the party’s problematic expulsion from the government, leadership change, and the departure of several prominent figures, especially the popular Minister of Foreign Affairs Lipavský. It shows that the party has succeeded in rebranding itself as an opposition force distinct from both the “populist” camp and the government. Its largely positive campaign, focused on issues particularly relevant to younger, educated voters, proved effective. This was especially evident in the two largest cities, Prague and Brno, where the Pirates finished third with almost 17% and 13% of the vote, respectively.

Government formation, consequences
The overwhelming victory of ANO and Andrej Babiš is thus the defining story of the Czech elections. Secondly, and perhaps similarly as important, is the fact that two potentially “Babiš-friendly” parties secured enough seats to become decisive actors in government formation, providing Babiš with a clear path to return as prime minister. This occurred despite the underperformance of both the radical right and the radical left, with the latter once again failing to enter parliament. Indeed, both AUTO and SPD, in their immediate reactions to the election results, declared their readiness to support a new Babiš government and categorically ruled out any cooperation with the former government parties or the Pirates. Likewise, these parties announced their intention to go into opposition, rejecting any support for Babiš and refusing to cooperate with AUTO and SPD. While the situation therefore appears rather straightforward and a “Babiš 2.0” government seems almost inevitable, the eventual composition and potential fragility of the new cabinet remain far from certain.
Coalition negotiations began only hours after the results were announced and, while broadly described as positive, it is already apparent that they will involve intense bargaining over cabinet portfolios and key positions within the Chamber of Deputies. One of the central questions concerns the role of SPD, a party with significant programmatic disagreements with ANO, particularly regarding EU and NATO membership and, relatedly, the degree of explicitness in its pro-Russian stance. Initially, SPD suggested that, given its disappointing result, it had no ambition to join the government and would be content to provide confidence and supply. However, this position shifted quickly, with party leader Tomio Okamura now demanding one to three ministries. It also remains unclear whether SPD would nominate its own members to cabinet posts or instead propose “experts” without party portfolios. Alternatively, the party might still opt for a confidence-and-supply arrangement in exchange for senior positions in parliamentary committees and the leadership of the Chamber of Deputies. The situation is further complicated by the fact that five of fifteen MPs elected on the SPD’s are leading members of PRO, Tricolour, and the Freedom Party with rather strong mandates (the leader of PRO beating Okamura in preferential votes), who may threaten to defect if they are not offered sufficient incentives. Several scenarios for SPD’s involvement are therefore possible. What is clear, however, is that SPD now has the opportunity to become the first radical-right party in Czech history to participate in government. Controversially, after the worst electoral result in the party’s history.
Moreover, even negotiations with AUTO, which is ideologically closer to ANO than SPD, may not prove straightforward. The challenges here concern not only cabinet positions, which AUTO has stated it definitely seeks, but also programmatic priorities. AUTO advocates a strongly fiscally conservative agenda, whereas ANO’s positions in this domain are considerably more interventionist. For instance, Babiš has already stated that AUTO’s proposals on balanced budget are “nonsense” and categorically rejected the possibility of the party receiving the post of Minister of Health.
As for the likely program of the next government, one thing appears clear: the participation and/or support of both SPD and AUTO would be bad news for advocates of green policies and minority civil rights, particularly regarding LGBTQ+ issues, as there is broad programmatic alignment among the three parties on these matters. What remains far less certain is the future course of foreign and security policy. A key question is the extent to which SPD, for whom anti-Ukrainian positions and an explicitly apologetic stance toward Russia are central, can exert influence in this area. Nevertheless, a continuation of the Fiala’s government’s almost unreservedly pro-Ukrainian position appears unlikely. Even though Babiš differs from leaders such as Fico and Orbán, he has clearly indicated that unconditional support for Ukraine cannot be expected, advocating instead a more “pragmatic” approach. A similar ambiguity surrounds AUTO. Although the party’s program states, among other things, that it opposes any negotiations with Russia before a withdrawal from Ukraine, the voting record and public statements of its sole MEP and main figure, Filip Turek, who also aspires to become Minister of Foreign Affairs, reveal a strong reluctance to support Ukraine (again more on pragmatic rather than on some ideological grounds). Overall, a new government led by ANO with the support of AUTO and SPD does not automatically translate into good news for Russia and bad news for Ukraine and the West, but neither can such an outcome be convincingly ruled out.
All in all, although a quick formation of populist radical right government is likely, given the policy disagreements both in foreign and economic policies among the parties, its durability is questionable and Mr. Babiš may be forced to look for support across political blocs during the term or to persuade the qualified majority of the parliament to call an early election.

Photo source: https://nazory.hn.cz/c1-67796570-drtive-vitezstvi-ano-nad-obranou-zeme-vyhrala-obrana-ceny-rohliku-dojde-k-obratu-v-politice-ceska