By Mila Mo (Sofia University)

Twelve. That’s the number of ballots Bulgarians have cast since April 2021, including seven in National Elections. And while elections are a normal democratic mechanism, this frequency is highly unusual. One thing is certain – it may sound like many different elections, but the issues remain the same.

Veni, Vidi, Vote
Since 2021, forming a stable majority has proven impossible, in contrast to the relative stability of the previous decade. Major anti-corruption sentiments and a perception of stagnation and lack of sufficient progress led to major protests in 2021 and gave rise to a set of new political entities. The highly populist and ideologically feeble ‘There is Such a People’ (ITN) won the 2021 vote to hover around 4 % in the last few votes. The second 2021 election saw the snap win of a more progressive and reformist ‘We Continue the Change’ (PP) which along with small liberal-conservative-green coalition Democratic Bulgaria (DB) led a 7-month government along with Socialists and ITN. Most of all this drove out of power centre-right GERB for the first time in nearly 12 years. Later, the PP-DB coalition also claimed major cities including the capital Sofia in the municipal elections in 2023 breaking 17 years of GERB rule.
Meanwhile, the only consistent parliamentary majority elections produce is one that obstructs judicial and anti-corruption reforms regardless of party colours. Any potential coalition, no matter how compromised, collapses under the weight of such reforms, which threaten the interests of too many political actors. This was the case with the ‘non coalition’ between centre-right GERB and liberal-reformist coalition PP-DB formed in 2023 with the two expected to rotate in governance on a joint legislative agenda. Following the first 9 months of PP-DB, the rotation collapsed and new elections were called. Further reforms, as usual, were postponed. A major Constitutional change was passed nevertheless, taking away the caretaker government formation power away from the President and cementing the Parliament intact between snap elections to ensure at least some accountability. Well intended, these changes opened the window to dangerous radical right and Russian-style precedents of legislative activity in the absence of a clear and accountable government. One such example is the ‘anti-LGBTI propaganda in schools’ act which swept through parliament with the support of GERB and the exception of PP-DB in August 2024. It passed with little opposition and major societal consequences. A caretaker government was just a by-stander. At least this time, Vazrazhdane’s ‘Anti-Foreign Agent’ Law which swiftly followed, did not pass.

The Longest Political Summer
To this backdrop, in the most recent election, voter turnout rose to 39%, up from June’s 34% and nearing April 2023’s 40%. The liberal-reformist coalition, PP-DB, managed to regain just under 40,000 votes after a steep loss of nearly 300,000 in June 2024. Despite this recovery, the coalition secured only 14% of the vote, narrowly holding second place over the radical-right, pro-Russian Vazrazhdane Party. This marks the second razor-thin race for the runner-up spot between the two. GERB has started regaining some strength following its 2021 drop from the leading place but it remains far from its glory days of over 1.1 million votes (2017). A consistent winner in the last few snap elections and climbing back to circa 650 000 votes, its hands are tied. One, 69 out 240 seats leave it nowhere but short of at least 2 coalition partners for a government. Two, its complacency to corruption, lack of reform will, implicating energy projects in favour of Russian interests like the ‘Turkish stream’ helping bypass Ukraine, leave it short of trust too. Its leader and former PM, Boyko Borisov, systematically courts pro-Kremlin Vazrazdhane and expresses regret that they are unable to govern together. At least rhetorically he maintains a pro-European coalition is necessary (with PP-DB) albeit a number of sabotaging efforts for any reform agenda the latter have put forward.
With the break-up of the Movement of Rights and Freedoms in the summer of 2024, a bastion of party unity in a country with high electoral volatility, the processes behind and true scope of state capture, the mechanisms of utilisation of the judicial system for political purposes and to discredit magistrates and politicians alike, and the use of state and private media has been further revealed.
Historically representing the Turkish minority following the communist regime’s nationalist policies, MRF has evolved into a cartel-like entity more invested in political survival and extracting state resources than democratic progress. Simultaneously, it keeps a liberal democratic face within the European Parliament and the international liberal community. Overtaken by its own phenomenon, oligarch and Magnitsky-sanctioned Delyan Peevski, the MRF’s two fractions both entered parliament with a number of politically motivated arrests and legal proceedings against the ‘original’ wing of supposed democratic dissident Ahmed Dogan during the campaign. This clearly revealed the depth of political influence over anti-corruption bodies, the State Prosecutor Service, the police and the Ministry of Interior in the hands of Peevski.
Most of all, this split showcased the size and scope of vote fraud with high competition in rural and small-town areas. Despite the reported incidents and the recorded vote rigging, Peevski’s ‘MRF-New Beginning’ faction received 11.5 % of the vote to 7.5 % for ‘the original ‘MRF Alliance’, which has a highly ethnically succinct electoral demography.
Although always part of the electoral map, no international observation mission has ever stated vote rigging was enough to overturn results. Yet, this time the Constitutional Court has initiated proceedings in the investigation of the need to annul the results of the early parliamentary elections for the 51st National Assembly. So, while this MRF war rages, the legitimacy of the vote remains highly compromised.

A Nation Adrift
At its core, Bulgaria grapples with a lack of clear purpose. Once unifying milestones—such as EU and NATO membership—have become routine achievements while new national goals, such as Eurozone membership and Schengen accession, lack the unifying power needed to mobilize citizens. Corruption, while still a persistent issue, no longer galvanizes mass protests, civic or voting activity in the way it did consistently and en masse only as far back as in 2021.
If in most European countries pro-Russian sentiments remain somewhat on the periphery of the political system, in Bulgaria, they have moved to the heart of state governance. Kremlin propaganda spokesmen occupy the highest political ranks, including the Presidency, political parties on the left and the right (such as Vazrazhdane, Bulgarian Socialist Party, Velichie etc.), and thus the consistent deliberate campaign to discredit Ukraine—and not the Russian aggression—is legitimized from the highest ranks of political discourse.
Adding to this dynamic is the high permeability of Bulgarian media environment to pro-Russian propaganda and disinformation, which goes with little to no alternative on social, private and state media alike. In addition, ‘political tourism’ of parties and formations with questionable financial and ideological profiles that emerge and vanish within months, attract enough electoral support to further fragment parliament and complicate the already challenging task of building parliamentary alliances.
Despite instability, recent polling offers some consolation. From 2017 to 2024, approval of NATO has risen from 28% to 40%, while negative attitudes remain unchanged at 26-28%. The perceived benefits of NATO membership have also grown, with the gap between positive and negative opinions expanding from 5 to 20 points in favour of transatlantic ties.
This progress may be overshadowed in the absence of a coherent national strategy with a unifying future-looking vision and a new bold re-definition of freedom and liberal democracy.

Where to look (for the 8th time)?
The things to watch out in 2025, apart from a potential 8th snap election, include:
a) further changes to the electoral code,
b) foreign Agent Law in its new, refined third version hitting precisely NGO’s and media which was deposited by Vazrazhdane on the first day of the new 51st parliament,
c) the rise of a catch-all mildly pro-Russian party under the auspices of the President but perhaps at least initially not under his leadership, and
d) calls for a referendum on NATO membership with the growing legitimacy of Vazrazhdane party and anti-Euro-Atlantic discourse.
Political parties, especially the more radical and populist parties, are the main driving force in provoking new dividing lines in society through strategies of inventing the image of the “other” while in government, in parliament, or on the campaign trail. These include millionaires, ‘Sorosoids’ and ‘Americanoids’, ‘war-lovers’ (those that support arming Ukraine), migrants, Roma, LGBTI, foundations, etc.). The process is further amplified by the mainstream, more moderate parties that benefit from and ally with the more radical on such issues, while adopting radical right narratives and positions themselves.
This leads to changes and further hardening of public opinion on issues related to individual rights and freedoms and has repercussions on the overall political debate, and the environment is becoming increasingly discriminatory not only against different minorities but also in terms of any dissent or disagreement.
In short, the problem is not corruption but the ease with which hatred is legitimised in a society forged by prejudice. In the absence of clear and goal directed behaviour things can easily drift from a pro-European narrative. Yet, after the EU practically lost Georgia, a painful and predictable loss, we must not abandon Bulgaria. As there is no other stronger universal truth than the one warning the biggest threat to democracy comes from within. And this holds for the EU as much as for its individual members.

Photo source: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/27/bulgarians-vote-in-another-election-but-end-to-political-deadlock-unlikely