By Sabine Pokorny (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung)

The 2025 Bundestag elections call supposed certainties into question. For a long time, the impact of the voters’ social status on voting behaviour declined. Voting behaviour was very volatile and voters changed between political parties of all directions. Candidates were getting more and more important for the voting decision. Germany was largely immune to a far-right party. People in East and West Germany were supposed to be getting more alike and less different. Germany was developing towards a consensus society. The Left Party was supposed to vanish from the party system. A high voter turnout was supposed to be a sign of a good democracy. These supposed certainties have to be questioned after the recent elections.

Electoral results
The CDU/CSU won the elections with 28.5 per cent of the votes. The CDU/CSU was the only centre party that could gain votes compared to the 2021 Bundestag elections (+4.4 points). The far-right AfD achieved 20.8 per cent and became the second-largest parliamentary group. With an increase of 10.4 points, it doubled its result compared to 2021. All parties of the so-called traffic light coalition (because of the parties’ colours red, yellow and green) suffered considerable losses. The SPD, party of chancellor Olaf Scholz, lost 9.3 points and could only muster 16.4 per cent of the votes. The Greens achieved 11.6 per cent (-3.1 points). The FDP only won 4.3 per cent of the votes (-7.1 points). The FDP thus achieved its worst result ever and failed to reach the five per cent hurdle for the second time after 2013. Therefore, the FDP will not be part of the next Bundestag. The Left Party, which had lost significantly in the East state elections in autumn 2024, achieved 8.8 per cent (+3.9 points). The BSW was unable to build on its success in the 2024 European elections and fell just short of the five per cent hurdle with 4.97 per cent of the votes. Thus, the BSW did not gain any seats in the next Bundestag.

Dissatisfaction
The political mood was characterised by a broad uncertainty and dissatisfaction. Before the elections, 85 per cent of the Germans were dissatisfied with the government. Satisfaction with politicians was very low. The expectations for the future were pessimistic. About 80 per cent believed Germany’s economic situation to be bad. This benefited the political fringes (AfD, Left Party, BSW) that gained a total of 19.3 percentage points, of which around 5 per cent are not represented in parliament. The voters of AfD and BSW were united in their dissatisfaction with democracy and their pessimistic view of the future. Both groups also showed a lower life satisfaction than other voter groups.

Fragmentation
The German electorate was significantly more fragmented than 2021. First, there was a geographical fragmentation. In the western states the CDU/CSU was the strongest party. In the eastern states, however, the AfD was the strongest party. And then there was Berlin, where the Left Party won narrowly with 19.9 per cent. Second, the fragmentation was reflected in the assessment of the parties’ top candidates. No candidate could profit from an advantage of incumbency. Beyond their own supporters, approval of politicians was low. This was particularly pronounced among the supporters of the AfD, the BSW and the Greens. Third, the fragmentation was reflected in the perception of political problems. The motives for the voting decision were heterogeneous. There was no issue that was rated similarly by large sections of the electorate. Every voter group had its own focus on political problems. And fourth, the electorate has become more differentiated in its political positions. Thus, the distances between voter groups have grown. At the same time, each voter group has become more homogeneous.

Polarization
The German electorate was also more polarized compared to 2021. This led to a high voter turnout of 82.5 per cent, the highest turnout since German unification. Like the dissatisfaction, the polarization also benefited the fringes of AfD, Left Party and BSW. All three parties together mobilized 2.5 million former non-voters. The parties of the political centre together only mobilized 1.3 million former non-voters. Therefore, a high turnout is not in itself a sign of a good democracy. On the contrary, in a polarized society it can strengthen the extremes.
At the 2024 European elections the Left Party only gained 2.7 per cent and it seemed they could not make it into parliament. Instead, since the middle of January 2025 the support of the Left Party has been increasing because of the growing polarization and the demonstrations against “the right” (“Demos gegen rechts”) and because of their candidates that performed well in social and other media.
With 20.8 per cent of the votes the AfD gained its best result in a Bundestag election. Never has a right-wing extremist party been part of the German Bundestag with that many votes. Voting for the AfD was not a protest vote anymore. Voters of the AfD support the party’s programme and its politicians. They believe the AfD to be competent to solve the country’s problems.
The personal, emotional polarization has increased. This regards different social groups. Asked with whom people do not want to have personal contact the rejection of most social groups has (slightly) increased. Especially the rejection of the voters of the Greens has increased considerably. Rejection of the voters of the AfD remained on a high level.
Furthermore, there seems to be a new social cleavage, especially regarding the Left Party and the AfD. The Left Party performed better among women than men and better in large cities than in rural areas. The party performed particularly well among young women in cities with a high educational level: 38 per cent of this group voted for the Left Party. As in previous elections, the AfD performed particularly well in the middle-aged groups. This time, however, it also made above-average gains among young men and therefore achieved above-average results among them. In addition, the AfD performed better in rural areas than in large cities. The AfD’s share was particularly high among young men in rural areas (36 per cent) and young men with a lower or middle educational level (44 per cent).

The aftermath
The main centre parties CDU/CSU and SPD together emerge weakened from the 2025 Bundestag elections although CDU/CSU won the elections. Political majorities are fragile, and the parties of the political centre do not contain a majority of two thirds of the votes that is necessary to change the constitution. Furthermore, the new electoral law means that some of the constituencies are not represented in the Bundestag because not every candidate who wins a constituency can also enter parliament. Some of the structurally strong regions will not be represented by a direct candidate anymore.

Photo source: https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2025/germany-election-day-photo-collection/